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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)0) •
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Appellants Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, The Carter-Reed
Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell
K. Friedlander (hereinafter referred to collectively in the singular as "Basic Research")
appeal from the district court's rulings in favor of Defendant Admiral Insurance
Company ("Admiral") and against Basic Research on cross-motions for summary
judgment. The sole issue on summary judgment was whether Admiral had an obligation
to defend Basic Research in three separate actions (the "Underlying Actions") involving
claims asserted by customers alleging false advertising in the marketing of a weight loss
product known as Akavar 20/50 ("Akavar"). Whether Admiral had such a duty to
defend is the issue for review.
STANDARD OF RE VIEW
This appeal presents the issue of interpretation of contracts of insurance. The
interpretation of a contract is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, giving no
deference to the district court. Saleh v Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, f 14, 133 P.3d
428.

6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Basic Research was the defendant in three putative class actions: Pamela Miller,
et. al v Basic Research, et. al, filed in the United States District Court, District of Utah,

<

Central Division. Case No. 2:07-CV-0087 ("the Miller action"); Mary Tompkins, et al. v
Basic Research, et al, filed in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of
i

Sacramento, Action No. 34-2007-00882581 ("the Tompkins action")1; and Nicole
Forlenza et al v Dynakor Pharmacol et al filed in the United States District Court,
Central District of California, Case No.: 2:09-CV-03730 ("the Forlenza action").2 These

(

Underlying Actions focus on the Underlying Plaintiffs' claim that Basic Research
advertised its product Akavar which the Plaintiffs purchased based on the alleged
misrepresentations: "EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT" and "WE
COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE."
i
Basic Research tendered its defense to Admiral in each of the three cases.
Admiral has not defended Basic Research.

I
1

The Tompkins action was subsequently removed to federal court and then transferred to
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, where it was then consolidated
with the Miller action.
2

The Miller action, the Tompkins action and the Forlenza action are hereafter referred to
collectively as "the Underlying Actions" and their plaintiffs are hereafter referred to as
"the Underlying Plaintiffs."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 7
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
J.

The Underlying Actions
A.
1.

The Miller Action

The Miller action has three class representatives: Pamela Miller, Randy

Howard and Donna Patterson. In Paragraph 10 of the Miller complaint, Ms. Miller states
that while conducting an Internet search on nutrition she saw an Internet advertisement
for Akavar that "professed in bold print that the user could "EAT ALL YOU WANT &
STILL LOSE WEIGHT..."

Miller alleges that based on that advertising, she

purchased a supply of Akavar. "After 25 days of taking Akavar as directed on the
package labeling, Ms. Miller gained ten pounds and she ceased using the product."
[Record on Appeal 803-04.]3
2.

In Paragraph 11 of the Miller complaint, Mr. Howard alleges that after

seeing an Akavar cardboard point-of-purchase advertising display, he purchased two
bottles of the product. "After two weeks of taking Akavar as directed on the package
labeling, without changing his eating habits, Mr. Howard had gained five or six pounds
and he ceased taking Akavar. [R 804.]
3.

In Paragraph 12 of the Miller Complaint, Ms. Patterson alleges that she saw

an Akavar advertisement in a national women's magazine that said "EAT ALL YOU
WANT & STILL LOSE WEIGHT." "Based on this advertising by Basic Research, Ms.
3

Admiral shall refer to the portions of the record in Appellant's addendum in the same
fashion as appellant, i.e., [R 100]. Where the reference is to Admiral's addendum, it will
be abbreviated [R 100*].
8
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Patterson purchased a supply of Akavar from a General Nutrition Store located in
Arlington, Virginia, for approximately $40.00.

After 30 days of taking Akavar as

directed on the package labeling, Ms. Patterson had lost no weight, and she ceased using

<

the product." [R 805*.]
B.

The Tompkins Action
i

4.

Mary Tompkins is the sole named plaintiff in the Tompkins action. She

alleges in her complaint that she purchased Akavar and that after approximately two
weeks "of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Tompkins had not lost

i

any weight. She ceased taking the product. [R 911.] In Paragraph 23 of her complaint,
Tompkins states that "[tjhe core of Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations regarding
Akavar is summarized in Defendants' slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight.'" [R
914.]
i
C.
5.

The Forlenza Action

The Forlenza Plaintiffs in the operative complaint with respect to the

Akavar product were Nicole Forlenza, and Shaiden Monroe. In the complaint, Ms.

|

Forlenza alleges that she purchased Akavar in reliance on representations made in
marketing material displayed at a Walgreens or GNC store. She took the supplement,
i
"but the product has not worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Forlenza has found
that she has not lost any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not
lost any weight without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

9

d

injury and damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and
because the product has not worked as advertised." [R1014-15.]
6.

In the Forlenza complaint, Ms. Monroe also alleges that she read and relied

on marketing materials displayed at a Walgreens or GNC and "consumed the product, but
the product did not work as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Monroe has found that she
has not lost any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any
weight without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Monroe has thus suffered injury and
damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the
product has not worked as advertised." [R 1015.]
77.

The Pertinent Provisions of the Admiral Policy
7.

The portion of the Admiral policy4 that provides the "Personal and

Advertising Injury" coverage is Coverage B. [R 37, R 96*.] For the purposes of the issue
presented, that coverage contains an insuring agreement, definitions and exclusions.
Appellant's Opening Brief5 essentially ignores the insuring agreement, even though it
contains the critical provision for the purposes of determining a "potential for coverage."6

4

There are two Admiral policies at issue, Policy CA00001165-01 effective August 20,
2007 and 2008 [R 29] and Policy CA00001165-02 effective August 20, 2009-2009
[R88]. The pertinent policy terms are identical as shown by the dual references in this
section. Accordingly, they are referred to in the singular such as "the Admiral policy" or
"the Admiral coverage."
5

Hereafter abbreviated "AOB."

6

As noted in more detail below, the complaint must allege and show the potential that
something alleged is ultimately covered under the insuring agreement.
10
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8.

The pertinent portion of the Coverage B Insuring Agreement is:

COVERAGE B - PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY
1.

Insuring Agreement

a.
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which
this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the
insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have
no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not
apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any offense and settle any
claim or "suit" that may result...
[R 37, R 96*.][emphasis added.]
9.

The "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" coverage defines "personal and

advertising injury" as follows:
14.
"Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including
consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the
right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person
occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor.
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders
or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or
organization's goods, products or services.
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a
person's right of privacy;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your advertisement."
[R 47,107.]
10.

The "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" coverage excludes, inter alia,

coverage for:
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To Conform To
Statements
"[PJersonal and advertising injury" arising out of the failure of goods,
products or services to conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in your "advertisement."
[R38, 97.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Summary of Basic Research's Argument
Basic Research claims that the portion of the "personal and advertising injury"

coverage that applies is that which covers the insured's liability for damages because of
"[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'."

It sets forth four

different reasons the district court erred in ruling in favor of Admiral. The separately
stated issues are basically arguments to the effect that the District Court should have
interpreted the policy in the fashion that Basic Research asserted was correct: Because
the incriminated statements ("EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT"
and "WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE") were trademarked by
Western Holdings, and because similar statements had been used by other entities to

12 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

advertise weight-loss products, the advertising injury offense of "the use of another's
advertising idea" provides coverage for the claims in the Underlying Action.
Accordingly, it is asserts that Admiral had a duty to defend. [AOB 1-2.]
While the application of Exclusion "g" is not mentioned in Basic Research's
statement of the "Issues for Review" [AOB 1-2], Basic Research argues in the body of its
brief that Exclusion "g" is inapplicable because: (i) neither of the alleged
misrepresentations "provides information about 'the essential or distinctive characteristic,
property or attribute' of Akavar;" (ii) neither "speaks to the grade, superiority or
excellence" of Akavar; (iii) and neither "addresses the manner or efficacy, or how Akavar
'reacts or fulfills its intended purpose.'" [AOB 45-47.]7
B.

Summary ofAdmiral's Response
Basic Research, as it did before the district court, proposes parsing the policy

language beyond the point of reasonableness and in a fashion that ignores the basic nature
and purpose of liability insurance in general and the terms of the policy in question in
particular. Specifically, Basic Research ignores the fundamental fact that advertising
injury liability insurance covers an insured for its liability for damages in actions brought
by plaintiffs who have been injured by the specific covered offenses defined in the
policy. As the allegations of the Underlying Complaints show, and the district court
found, the Underlying Plaintiffs do not claim that they were damaged by Basic

7

Exclusion "g" was the basis given by the trial court for granting Admiral's motion for
summary judgment. Ruling, Page 18.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law13
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Research's use of the slogans. Rather, they claim to have been injured because the
slogans for Akavar were not true, because plaintiffs could not "eat all they wanted and
still lose weight.8 Accordingly, there is no potential for coverage and no obligation to
defend.9
Additionally, Admiral contends that what the Underlying Plaintiffs allege is
specifically addressed in and excluded from coverage by the Admiral Policy's Personal
and Advertising Injury Exclusion "g." That provision unambiguously states that there is
no coverage for personal and advertising injury arising out of the failure of the insured's
goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or performance
made in the insured's advertisement. Every single Underlying Plaintiff alleges that he or
she saw Basic Research's representations, purchased and used Akavar and did not lose
weight.

The clear import of the charges is that Akavar lacked the quality and

performance represented by Basic Research.
Because the Underlying Plaintiffs do not allege a covered offense and because the
policy clearly excludes the type of offense Underlying Plaintiffs do allege, there is no
8

The district court stated:
While Plaintiffs maintain that class action suits were the result of their use
of the noted slogans, upon review of the complaints it is apparent that the
basis of the claim against Plaintiffs is the failed promise of weight loss
without any behavior or lifestyle changes and not the use. of the phrases
"Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight" and And We Couldn't Say It In
Print If It Wasn't True" to advertise Akavar.
Ruling, Page 13 [emphasis that of the court.]
9

Lack of coverage under the insuring agreement was the basis of the district court's
denial of Basic Research's motion for summary judgment. Ruling, Page 17
14
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potential for coverage and no duty to defend. Accordingly, the district court judgment
should be affirmed.
ADMIRAL'S ARGUMENT
A.

Applicable Insurance Law
1.

Interpretation of Insurance Policies

Insurance policies are contracts just like any other contracts, and are interpreted
under general contract principles. See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37 ^f
14, 140 P.3d 1210.

If the language within the four corners of the contract is

{

unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language. See id . Furthermore, when courts find that the contract language
is clear they will not give it a strained interpretation to find coverage:
[A] court [is restrained] from liberally and unreasonably construing an
insurance contract to permit a strained or unnatural interpretation in order to
find coverage for innocent victims who are subjects of enormous sympathy.
Otherwise, the effect would be to bind the insurer to a risk that was not
contemplated and for which it was not paid.
Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Utah 1993) (brackets in
original).
In construing a contract, the intention of the parties is controlling. In interpreting a
contract, the court looks to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and
considers each contract provision in relation to all others, with a view to giving effect to
all and ignoring none. See Selvig v. Blockbuster Enterprises, 2011 UT 39, ^|23 see also
Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, % 10, 94
15
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<

P.3d 292. Utah Courts "determine the legal import of insurance policies, affording the
policy terms their usually accepted meanings and giving effect to harmonizing to the
extent possible all policy provisions." S. W. Energy v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 UT 23,
U12, 974 P.2d 1239.
That the parties have different views about the meaning of the key terms does not
render the terms ambiguous. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192
(Utah Ct. App.) ("[A] contract term is not ambiguous simply because one party ascribes a
different meaning to it to suit his or her own interests."), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(1993); see also Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Utah 1993)
("However, policy terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks
to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests.") A
contract term is ambiguous if susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.
Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52 ^[19, 215 P.3d 933; see also ; see also S.W.
Energy, 1999 UT 23 at f 14 ("An insurance policy may be ambiguous if it is unclear,
omits terms, or is capable of two or more plausible meanings.")
2.

The Duty to Defend

In Green v. State Farm, 2005 UT App 564, 127 P.3d 1279 , the Utah Court of
Appeals summarized Utah's law on the duty to defend:
Although it is a general rule that "an insurer's duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify," Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d
127, 133 (Utah 1997) , that duty is not without boundaries. "[T]he
insured's obligation is not unlimited; the duty to defend is measured by the
nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the
16
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insurer ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the
policy." Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 714 P.2d. 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986), ... "Under Utah law, the scope of
the risk an insurance company takes is determined by the terms of the
policy, not the expectations of the insured." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson,
904 F.Supp. 1270, 1277 n. 8 (D. Utah 1995).
Id atlffllO, 12.
Based on the foregoing tenets, the duty to defend analysis in Utah focuses on two
documents: the insurance policy and the complaint. An insurer's duty to defend is
determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the
complaint. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at \ 16 . "The test is whether the complaint alleges a
risk within the coverage of the policy."

Id. (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of

Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, If 21, 27 P.3d 555). When the allegations of the underlying
complaint, "if proved, could result in liability under the policy, then the insurer has a duty
to defend." Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997).

i

In Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United States Fid. & Guar.
(Utah 1986) 714 P.2d. 1143, a case relied on by Basic Research, defendant Deseret was
accused of constructively evicting the underlying plaintiff, Catherine's Beauty Salon
(referred to in the decision as "Catherine's"), by virtue of demolition activities that
Deseret was conducting on Deseret5s property where Catherine's was Deseret's tenant.
One of the two insurers for Deseret, United Pacific, denied defense, a decision that was
upheld by the trial court and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The coverage issue
i

was whether the alleged liability producing conduct was an "occurrence," i.e., an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law17
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"accident." The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision with respect to the "potential for
coverage," set forth the nexi among the facts, the policy provisions and the insured's
liability:
The insurer must make a good faith determination based on all the
facts known to it, or which by reasonable efforts could be discovered by it,
that there is no potential liability under the policy. This means that there
are no disputed facts which if proved by the plaintiff at trial would
result in liability under the policy. However, this does not mean that the
insurer can simply say, "We don't believe that the plaintiff can prove what
he is alleging." The insurance contract includes the duty to defend even if
the allegations in a suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. The question is
whether the allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy.
The policy describes the damages covered as "bodily injury or
property damage caused by an occurrence" and then provides that "the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking such damages on account of bodily injury or property damage..."
Catherine's complaint did not allege, even in substance, bodily injury or
property damage caused by an "occurrence." Catherine's alleged facts to
support claims for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive
eviction. Those allegations presented no potential liability under UP's
insurance policy. Where there is no potential liability, there is no duty
to defend.
Id. at 1147 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the question with respect to the duty to defend is whether the alleged
facts that create liability for damages on the part of the insured, if proved, would be
covered under the policy. Until those facts are proved, there is only the potential that
they will be proved. Accordingly, the Courts refer to the "potential for coverage" or the
"potential for liability" under the policy. Conversely, when there is no potential for

In accord, Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 (Utah 1997).
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coverage (because the facts, if proven, do not come within the insuring agreement or are
excluded from coverage), there is no duty to defend.
B.

The Nature and Structure of the "Personal and Advertising Injury"
Liability Coverage.
1.

,

The relationship between the "personal and advertising
injury" offense and the insured's liability for damages.

The designation of Coverage B as "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability" is set forth
in boldface capital letters and tells the insured, at the very least, that there is a connection
between "Personal and Advertising Injury" and the insured's liability. See supra, STATEMENT
OF FACTS at \ 8.
The personal and advertising injury definition itself provides coverage for
approximately fourteen types of categorized "offenses," and with each it is clear that the
specific offense and conduct must have some causal link to the underlying plaintiffs
claim of liability for damages. See supra id. at \ 9 ("'Personal and advertising injury'
means injury, including consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the
following offenses . . . .");

see also National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
{

Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978) (the words "arising out o f
"import a concept of causation" and require that "there be some causal relationship
between the injury and risk for which coverage is provided."). The risk, for which

\

coverage is provided, is any risk identified in the Insuring Agreement.
For instance, subpart "a" of the "personal and advertising injury" definition
<

identifies the offenses of false arrest, detention or imprisonment. Clearly, the policy
19
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provides and an insured would objectively and reasonably understand that where it is
alleged that the insured will become liable for falsely arresting, detaining or imprisoning
the complaining party, Admiral will defend and pay the damages the injured party may
be awarded. Such construction can and should be applied to each subpart and offense of
the "personal and advertising injury" definition, including subpart f, which is at issue
here. Also, subpart "g," identifies the offense of infringement upon another's copyright,
trade dress or slogan in the insured's advertisement. Clearly, the policy provides and a
reasonable purchaser of insurance objectively understands that where it is alleged that the
insured will become liable for infringing upon the underlying plaintiffs copyright, trade
dress or slogan in its advertisement, Admiral will defend and pay the damages the injured
plaintiff may be awarded.
In sum, the complete list of the offenses, and the entire definition of "personal and
advertising injury,"11 clearly advise the insured that the policy provides a defense to the

In 1878, the United States Supreme Court employed the similar approach of applying
the rule of noscitur a sociis in Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1879):
...In the interpretation of written instruments and statutes that "a passage
will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it."
So, also, "the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words associated with it." In Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 450, it
is said: "It is a rule laid down by Lord Bacon, that copulatio verborum
indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu, — the coupling of words together
shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. And where the
meaning of any particular word is doubtful or obscure, . . . the intention of
the party who has made use of it may frequently be ascertained and carried
unto effect by looking at the adjoining words." The same author says (p.
455): "In the construction of statutes, likewise, the rule noscitur a sociis is
20
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insured where it is alleged that the insured committed one of the defined offenses which
is asserted to be the cause of the insured's liability for damages.
2.

The use of Western Holdings' Slogans is not an "offense."

There is a reason for use of the term "offense." The conduct covered is conduct
that is wrongful and offends someone. That someone is the underlying plaintiff who is
seeking damages. Here, the Underlying Plaintiffs do not claim that they are offended
much less injured by Basic Research's wrongful taking or use of another's advertising
idea. Nor does the alleged trademark holder of the slogans, Western Holdings, claim that
it is offended by Basic Research's use as it is undisputed that Basic Research had a
license to use of the slogans. Indeed, the authorized use is inferred from the relationship
between Basic Research and Western Holdings as evidenced by the fact that Western
Holdings is a named insured under the 2008-2009 policy. [R 124*.] Accordingly, the use
of the "slogans" cannot constitute an "offense" to trigger coverage under the Admiral
policy.
The court in the recent case Westfield Insurance Company v. Robinson Outdoors,

very frequently applied; the meaning of a word, and, consequently the
intention of the legislature, being ascertained by reference to the context,
and by considering whether the word in question and the surrounding
words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and referable to the same subjectmatter."
Id. at 708-709. In 1996 another court applied noscitur a sociis to find the lack of
coverage under a policy's personal and advertising injury coverage. Applied Bolting
Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029, 1033, n. 6 (E.D. Pa, 1996).
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Inc.,

2011 WL 5593171 (D.Minn.) reached the same conclusion.

Consumers sued

Robinson Outdoors, Inc. (hereinafter "Robinson5') in multiple jurisdictions for false
representations concerning the attributes of odor-eliminating clothing. Robinson sold its
odor eliminating products under a license granted by ALS Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter
"ALS"). Under the license, Robinson was contractually obligated to use the advertising,
logos, brands and marks provided by ALS, and ALS created or approved all of
Robinson's advertising. Id. at *1.
Robinson sought defense and indemnification from its commercial general
liability insurer, Westfield Insurance Co (hereinafter "Westfield"). Westfield denied any
obligation to defend and indemnify Robinson, and then pursued a declaratory relief
action. Id. at *2.
In opposing Westfield's motion for summary judgment, Robinson contended that
it was covered under the personal and advertising injury coverage for the offense of the
"use of another's advertising idea..." The argument made by Robinson is the precise
argument made by Basic Research here: that because the advertising idea was that of
licensor ALS, the requisite "use of another's" was satisfied and coverage was triggered.
The Court disagreed, finding that the offense means "wrongful taking of the manner by
which another advertises its goods", and ruled: "Robinson's use of ALS's advertising
ideas was not wrongful and did not constitute an offense because it was done under a
license granted by ALS." Id. at *7. The Westfield Decision is appended as part of the
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Addendum to this Brief.
3.

The Underlying Plaintiffs do not assert an "offense."

The Underlying Plaintiffs do not question or claim the wrongful "use" or taking of
Western Holding's slogans. Rather, they challenge the content and truth of the slogans.
This precise issue was addressed in the Westfield case:
Westfield presents no case law to support its assertion that this language
would cover the licensed use of another's advertising idea. Moreover, the
underlying complaints did not allege that Robinson took the advertising
ideas of any of the plaintiffs in the underlying actions. See, e.g.,
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003
(S.D.Ind. 2011) ("We are hard-pressed to understand how use of a codefendant's idea, as opposed to one of the plaintiff[']s, could be
considered an 'offense.' ")
Id. at n. 9 (emphasis within the original.)
4.

The requisite causal connection between the offense and the
claimed damage is absent.

As the definition of "personal and advertising injury" requires a causal connection
between the enumerated offense and the underlying plaintiffs claim for liability, so too
does Admiral's policy's insuring agreement's language require such causal connection.
The insuring agreement provides: "We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to
which this insurance applies..." [Emphasis added.]
Under the clear language of the insuring agreement, the insured has coverage
where the insured is 1) legally liable for damages, 2) because of "personal and
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advertising injury;" and 3) to which the insurance applies (i.e., is not excluded).

And

the duty to defend requires the existence of alleged facts that, if proved, would be the
basis for the insured's legal liability for damages.
In sum, in order for there to be coverage, the advertising injury offense must cause
the Underlying Plaintiffs damages and insured to be liable for those damages. And for
there to be a duty to defend, the complaint must allege facts by which a personal and
advertising injury offense is alleged and that offense, if proved, would render the insured
liable for damages. Here no Underlying Plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured
because Basic Research used or wrongfully took the advertising slogan of Western
Holdings, rather than using its own slogan or idea. The offense complained of by the
Underlying Plaintiffs is not that any particular person's representation was used; but that
the representation, whoever the originator may have been, was false.
C.

Case Law Supports Admiral's Position
Although Utah courts have not yet addressed the interpretation of the advertising

injury offense in question, several other courts have done so. For example, in Clarcor,
Inc. v. Columbia Casualty, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D. Tenn. Dec 16, 2010) [R14431454*], the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurer in an

See generally, Fire Ins. Exchange v. Jimenez 184 Cal.App.3d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the provision stating that there is no duty to defend for injury "to which this
insurance does not apply," means that there is no duty to defend where an exclusion
applies to what otherwise might be a covered suit).
24
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action brought against insured Clarcor by the 3M Company and alleging false advertising
under both federal and state law.
Clarcor designed the packaging and advertising for its new line of Purolator filters
which allegedly competed with 3M's Filtrete line. 3M claimed that Clarcor designed the
packaging to convey the false and misleading claims that Purolator filters perform
equally to, if not better than, 3M's Filtrete filters. 3M further maintained that several
aspects of the package design created this false impression, including numerical
performance claims of "overall filtration efficiency" and the claimed "respiratory
protection factor." 3M charged, that consumers would be led to believe that the Purolator
filter was more efficient in removing particles from the air than the 3M filter, even
though Purolator's claim of 97% Overall Filtration Efficiency is not only literally false, it
created a false impression of superiority to the 3M product. Id. at *2.
Clarcor tendered defense to Columbia Casualty Company ("Columbia"), which
declined coverage. Clarcor defended itself, settled with 3M, and then sued Columbia. In
ruling upon the cross motions for summary judgment filed by Clarcor and Columbia, the
court addressed claims similar to those made by Basic Research and construed policy
language identical to that found in the Admiral policy.
Clarcor contended that the allegations of the 3M complaint were covered under the
offense of "use of another's advertising in your advertisement." Specifically, Clarcor
contended that 3M's allegations of Clarcor's packaging and advertising ideas, such as
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color scheme and numerical rating system, were 3M's ideas, and that, when read in
conjunction with 3M's other allegations, a covered claim was stated. However, the court
noted that Clarcor re-characterized 3M's claims as involving an "advertising idea" by
selectively choosing words and phrases from various sections of 3M's complaint and
ultimately concluded, "3M's complaint involved false advertising.

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs contentions on the issue are without merit." Id. at * 13. [ R 1452*.]
Like Clarcor's attempted re-characterization of 3M's claim to trigger coverage, so
too, has Basic Research cobbled together portions of the Underlying Complaints to claim
that the Underlying Plaintiffs "do not allege injury from the class members' failure to
lose weight, but from their purchase of the product caused by the advertising" [AOB at
20].

In truth, each of the Underlying Plaintiffs specifically alleges that he or she used

the product as directed and failed to lose weight.

The Clarcor court reached the

conclusion that 3M's claims against Clarcor were false advertising, and false advertising
was not "use of another's advertising idea." Basic Research also stands accused of false
advertising, not "use of another's advertising idea."
In Welch Foods v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3928704 (D. Mass.
2010), Welch manufactured and sold fruit juice, including what it described as "White
Grape and Pomegranate" juice. The product label prominently pictured pomegranates
when, in fact, the primary ingredients were white grape and apple juice.

26
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Welch was sued by a competitor, POM Wonderful, a company that produced its
own blended pomegranate juices, for false and misleading advertising. Thereafter a
putative class of "disaffected consumers" sued Welch for false advertising and deceptive

(

labeling. The POM complaint alleged that Welch had attempted to "cash in on POM's
idea of selling bottled pomegranate juice by marketing and selling to consumers products
i

labeled as 'pomegranate juice' that in fact contain little or no actual pomegranate juice.5'
Id. at * 4 n. 4. Similarly, the class action plaintiffs alleged that Welch used POM's
advertising idea and misled consumers by "naming, labeling, packaging, marketing and
advertising [Welch's juice] as [containing pomegranate juice]." Id. (brackets within
original.)

{

Welch tendered both underlying actions to three of its insurers. Two declined
coverage and one defended under a reservation of rights. All three were named as
(

defendants in coverage litigation.
The matter was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. One of the
issues was whether the allegations in the underlying cases implicated the policy's

<

coverage for the offense of "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement."
The court found that no covered offense was alleged:
I

The essence of the argument is that Welch has "used" POM's advertising
idea by claiming that pomegranate juice is an ingredient (with the
attendant implication that Welch's product has salutary health effects).
However, "the phrase 'advertising idea' relates to the manner in which
one advertises its goods" and does not include the content of such
advertising. (Citation.) The coverage provision is limited to Welch's use,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in its advertising ideas about how to solicit business and customers.
(Citation.) Welch has not done that.
Welch at *4 [R 1458*]. Once again, a court has refused to equate false advertising (be it
claimed by a competitor or a consumer) with the covered offense of "use of another's
advertising idea."
In Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois International, 657 F.3d 1155 (11 Cir. 2011), the
insured Trailer Bridge was accused of conspiracy to fix prices with respect to cabotage
services. The complaint alleged that the defendants met secretly and issued materially
false public statements about the reasons for rate and surcharge increases. The policy
language was materially identical to that employed by Admiral herein.
Before the trial court, Trailer Bridge pointed out that its CEO gave an interview to
the Wall Street Transcript, a newsletter targeted at long-term investors, that constituted an
"advertisement" and that the CEO deployed the "advertising idea" of "another" because
the CEO's misleading justifications for price increases must have originated with Trailer
Bridge's competitors (and alleged co-conspirators). Id. at 1138. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer ruling that the CEO's brief description
of market conditions did not involve use of another's advertising ideas. Id.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted (and appended) the
district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order." But before doing so, the court
addressed the breadth of the coverage for "the use of another's advertising..."
In particular, we agree with the district courts rejection of Trailer Bridge's
28
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convoluted argument that the CEO's statement deployed the advertising
idea of "another." The Policy defines "advertising injury5' as an injury
arising from "[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement.5 55 We reject Trailer Bridge's contention that the use of a
co-defendant's (and alleged co-conspirator's) idea—as opposed to the idea
of a plaintiff in the underlying antitrust action—could qualify as an
"offense55 under the Policy. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003 ( S.D.Ind. 2011) (rejecting a similar
argument and noting that research revealed no case in which "an
underlying complaint for antitrust injury triggered an insurer's duty
to defend for an advertising injury caused by ... ' the use of another's
advertising idea in your advertisement555). The underlying plaintiffs
sought only antitrust damages; they did not seek to impose any legal
obligation upon the insured to pay them damages "because of ...
advertising injury.55 No facts were alleged in the underlying complaint on
the basis of which the underlying plaintiffs might have recovered damages
"because of... advertising injury55; and the underlying plaintiffs could not
have recovered such damages because the allegedly misappropriated
"advertising idea55 was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was
alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether.

{

{

{

Trailer Bridge at 1139 (boldface in the original).
While the Trailer Bridge case was decided under Florida law, a reading of the

<

decision shows that there is no material difference between the law of Florida and the law
of Utah with respect to the interpretation of contracts or the breadth of the duty to defend.
Before the district court, Trailer Bridge argued that it was of no moment that the
underlying claims alleged violation of antitrust law. Rather all that was required to
trigger coverage was: (i) that the Antitrust complaint allege that some injury arose out of

j

the use of another's advertising idea, (ii) that the Court must construe the policy liberally
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, and (iii) that to limit coverage as
suggested by the carrier would rewrite the contract. Id. at 1144-45. These are precisely
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i

the same arguments advanced in this case The Court rejected Trailer Bridge's argument,
noting, as Admiral claims herein, the relationship between the Insuring Agreement and
the "personal and advertising injury" offense:
The rule that an insurance policy should be interpreted liberally in favor of
the insured applies only when there is more than one reasonable
interpretation. (Citation omitted.) The Policy specifically states Illinois
National must provide a defense only to cases seeking sums that the
insured would become legally obligated to pay as damages "because o f
personal and advertising injury.
*

*

*

*

Thus, it is apparent the underlying plaintiffs allege their injuries were
caused by higher prices arising from price-fixing, not from the use of
another's advertising idea in Trailer Bridge's advertisement. None of the
damages sought by the underlying plaintiffs in the Antitrust Complaint are
payments requested "because o f an advertising injury, but instead were
strictly for antitrust injuries.
Id. at 1145. The Trailer Bridge decision is appended as part of the Addendum to
this Brief.
Lastly, the case of Rose Acre Farms v. Columbia Casualty, — F.3d — , 2011 WL
5313818 (7th Cir. 2011), case is the most recent opinion to address and construe the
enumerated offense of "use of another's advertising idea." The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the same arguments made in Trailer Bridge case, and by Basic Research
here, that a claim of use of another's advertising idea is enough to trigger coverage even
though the underlying plaintiff is not seeking to hold the insured liable for such wrongful
use or taking of the advertising idea.
The insured, Rose Acre Farms, was sued in a number of class action suits for
alleged price-fixing. The Rose Acre's insurers rejected the contention that there was a
30
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duty to defend under the personal and advertising injury offense of "the use of another's
advertising in your 'advertisement.'" Rose Acre sued its insurers for coverage and the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. Id. at * 1.

j

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was skeptical about whether there was any
advertising involved in the underlying actions. But assuming that there was advertising
involved in the underlying actions, the court found that the offense was not alleged:
But this suit would fail even if one could tease out of the antitrust
complaint a charge that Rose Acre's advertising was in furtherance of the
alleged antitrust conspiracy. Coverage of liability for an "offense" defined
as "the use of another's advertising idea" in one's own advertising cannot
extend to using another's advertising idea with that other's consent.
Suppose Rose Acre published on its website the following ad, written by
its director of marketing: "We are socialists, we abhor profits, and we sell
our eggs at cost." Although that ad might be thought in furtherance of the
antitrust conspiracy, any antitrust liability that it created would not be
"advertising injury" because the company's marketing director is not
'another." What difference could it make if instead the ad had been
written by Rose Acre's advertising agency?

{

i

i

Id. at *2.
The Court then proceeded to trace the history of the "use of another's advertising
idea" offense. It noted that this iteration of the offense replaced an earlier offense of
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" and explained the
reason for the revision:
The reason [for the revision] was that a conflict had developed in the
courts over whether "misappropriation" was used in the policy in its
common law sense, which does not include trademark infringement, or
should be read in a broader, layperson's sense. (Citations omitted.) To
resolve the conflict, ISO replaced "misappropriation" with "use" and, for
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i

good measure, added explicit coverage for trademark infringement.
This history makes clear that coverage is limited to liability to the
"other" whose advertising idea is used by the insured without the "other's"
permission. That is what "misappropriation" is; and the question whether
as used in an insurance policy it might embrace trademark infringement
does not alter the understanding that using someone else's idea with that
someone's consent is not misappropriation.
7tf.at*2-3.
That "use of another's advertising idea" is essentially "misappropriation" is the
analysis that the district court made and followed in this case when it ruled that Basic
research was not entitled to coverage. (Ruling Pages 13-15.) The Rose Acre decision is
appended as part of the Addendum to this Brief.
Applying the rationale and reasoning of the foregoing case law to the present case
leads to the conclusion that the Underlying Plaintiffs allege that Basic Research falsely
advertised Akavar by claiming that consumers of the product could "EAT ALL YOU
WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT" and that "WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN PRINT IF
IT WASNT TRUE." Those claims of injury concern the alleged false content of the
slogans, and do not in any way arise out of the wrongful taking or use of Western
Holding's advertising idea as required to trigger coverage. Basic Research's attempt to
force the Underlying Plaintiffs' false advertisement claims into the covered offense of
"the use of another's advertising idea" is tortured and does not trigger coverage.
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Admiral.
32
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D.

The Applicability of Exclusion "g."
Exclusion "g" provides that there is no coverage for personal or advertising injury

"arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of
quality or performance made in [the insured's] 'advertisement'." See STATEMENT OF
FACTS at flO [R 38, 97].

The plain foundation of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claims:

that each relied on false advertising that told him or her in no uncertain terms ("we
couldn't say it if it wasn't true") that Akavar worked such that a purchaser could "eat all
you want and still lose weight." These statements go to the heart of the product's quality
and performance and the alleged failure to conform to the advertised statement.
The Underlying Plaintiffs make the clear and unambiguous charge that Basic
Research represented that its product would cause weight loss irrespective of the user's
eating habits.

Such a representation is clearly a statement as to the quality or

performance of the product and falls within the scope of Exclusion "g" such that there is
no duty to defend against the claim that the statement is untrue.
Total Call Int% Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 181 Cal App.4th 161 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010), collects and summarizes the cases that address Exclusion "g", also known as the
"Failure to Conform" Exclusion.13 The Total Call Court states:

Total Call itself did not involve the offense of "use of another's advertising idea." It
involved alleged trade libel and disparagement. However, the court did find Exclusion
"g" applicable.
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L. No Coverage Due to Exclusion
We also conclude that there was no potential for policy coverage in view of
the nonconformity exclusion, which bars coverage for advertising injury
rising out of the 'failure of goods, products or services to conform, with
statement of quality or performance made in [the insured's!
advertisement."" Several courts have held m.a this exclusion precludes
coverage for third pan
suns prediealed on allegations that the insured's
advertising misrepresented the quaht\ o; price o1 the insured^ o^n pn <' *.t
m Miyiuik ita. .<,,* LN.L.\, 1 nc. v. Assurance < e I i i nw \i 4w«- F.3d b82,
984, a seller ol control devices for garage dooi openeis advertised that its
devices were compatible with the security features of a manufacturer's
i oner, but the devices, in feet, disabled the secunn features Whit: he
manufacturer sued tin seller \\>i iah- advcnisane.. the *elk-'s ?n- rer
declined to provide a defense, pointing to the exclusion at issue belon us.
" ',/.) After the insurer obtained a summary judgment in its favor in the
ter's bad faith action, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
iiilacturer's claims relied entirely on the allegation that the seller's
.ees "[did] not live up to the promise of compatibility," and thus
co\erage lor the claims was precluded under the nonconformity exclusion.
(Id at pp. 984-985,}
In New Hampshire Ins. t o. v. Power-u real, inc {> i tr ivvw) 907 F.2d
58, 58-59, a competitor of the insured sued the insured for deceptive
business practices, alleging that the insured's ,ui\crtising mislabeled the
insured's own composted manure products. The Highth Circuit concluded
that ti^ allegations in ihe third part) complaint did not trigger the insurer's
duty t«' defend, reasoning that thev wete barred h\ an exclusion essentially
simila u- ih.at before us i *W at p ^ 0 )
Finally iii ^upcrpcr/ormuncc 7//n/,. . ;iurt/orj uoy. ms. \L..L.. \ . ' uz;
203 F.Supp.2d 587. 58(>-5c)(L a manufacturer of sports cars anci . tted
produ t s.^4; tlu insured !*•! marketing similar products mproperb
bearing the manufacturer'- name After the insurer declined ! - pro'-i \:
s
defense \v t!u: action. :he koera! district
r
oneluded that the
nonconn u ty exclusion precluded coverage ult r u manufacaref- sdse
adver!isr) Jaims. (hi :\\ v <(>^ *
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TCI contends that the nonconformity exclusion is ambiguous, and can be
reasonably understood as operating to bar coverage for claims by
consumers, but not claims by competitors. Pointing to Aragon-Haas v.
Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal App.3d 232 [282 Ca.
Rptr. 233. {Aragon-Haas), TCI argues that we are obliged to accept its
proffered interpretation of the exclusion for purposes of assessing Peerless's
demurrer, (fn. omitted). As the nonconformity exclusion is not ambiguous,
we reject TCFs contention.
Total Calllnt'l, 181 Cal.App.4th at 172-173.
The foregoing cases and the courts' analyses of Exclusion "g" are persuasive. The
scope of the policy does not include coverage for false advertising with respect to the
quality or performance of the insured's goods, products or services. The Underlying
Plaintiffs charge that Akavar doesn't work like the advertisement says it will. That is,
you can't eat all you want and still lose weight. The allegations clearly incriminate the
product's quality and performance.

Accordingly, the exclusion is applicable and

precludes coverage for Basic Research.
RESPONSE TO BASIC RESEARCH ARGUMENTS
The arguments advanced by Basic Research are addressed above by Admiral's
arguments and authorities in support of its argument.

However, some of Basic

Research's particular arguments warrant specific comment.
A.

No Reasonable Interpretation of the Underlying Actions Leads to the
Conclusion that Any of the Underlying Plaintiffs Assert the Offense of
"Use ofAnother's Advertising Idea" or That the Policy Language is
Ambiguous.
Any reasonable interpretation of the Underlying Actions leads to the determination

that the Underlying Plaintiffs allege that Basic Research falsely advertised Akavar in
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their ads by claiming

* .*

wouldn't do with ihe appropnau effori

*1 •~ *

!

ilk- Underl}ing Plaintiffs* claims focu^ u^ ihc

content of the ads theniseives arid not the use of another's advertising idea, Basic
Rcsciich ^ iiltoitipi n

JHH

inniiii iliusi I

IJIIII

inhi 111

IIMIHI

offense i I illllii n1

another's advertising idea" is tortured and unreasonable. Moreover, while at :uin
basic tenets *.rr
ambigut u

she

TT

!ah insurance h\\\ MMI insurant'- ^ -r- _ language is considered
. cr ^

construeu a ^^

I

two or more plausible meanings, and ambiguities are
•<.<

=

- v ••

interpretation.
Citing five supposed icanons |/\OR 32-33] that the policy's term "of another"

those incriminated b} UnderKiny Plaintiffs

Research fails to MIUW VMI

interpretation is reasonable (i.e., would be the understanding of the i-rdinar
Set

•/*

-

.

*

)t»-i

insured.)
M

^°

meaning be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence <\--w J ' ^ ^ M >It«lii ••" "
Basic Research's asserted reasons for tin; term ol another" explains why, the reasonable
iiisiihti vnHilil I I 111 ni Ik Mini, uii Iht/ OIK' IK

*•• ; c K no coverage if he came up with the

false or misleading statement hini sell, hil MI Ihr olhrr t.iitd lli.'ir r, ro\ /rain1 i! sonn um
else conjured up the misrepresentation which the insured then used.
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The Court in Westfield posed that same inquiry and rejected this interpretation of
the policy language. See Westfield , 2011 WL 5593171 at *7. See also Rose Acre
Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F.Supp.2d 994, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2011) ("We are
hard-pressed to understand how use of a co-defendant's idea, as opposed to one of the
plaintiffs, could be considered an 'offense.'").
While courts resort to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain or ordinary
meaning of words used in an insurance contract, they do not cherry pick definitions and
use them literally without reference to context and the agreement in its entirety.
In Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992), the California
Supreme Court rejected the premise that because terms in a policy could be interpreted in
a particular fashion, they should be.

The insured was charged with a variety of

transgressions amounting to unfair competition under California statutes. The Bank
sought coverage under a policy that covered "unfair competition" as part of its
advertising injury coverage. The Court of Appeal held that the term "unfair competition"
was ambiguous because it could refer to either common law or statutory law. The
California Supreme Court reversed, holding that only common law unfair competition
was covered.
The court conceded the insured's arguments that it was "plausible" that the term
"unfair competition" included statutory unfair competition, "that policy terms must be
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interpreted in their ordinary and popular sense'" and that a dictionary definition could be
used to support the insured's position. It noted, however:
While the foregoing argument is probably correct as a matter of abstract
philology; it is defective as \ matter of policy interpretation because it
disregards the context
I'he policy does not purport to cover "unfair
competition" in the abstract; instead, it covers "damages" for "advertising
injury" caused by "unfair competition." Read in this context, the term
"unfair competition" can only refer to a civil wrong that can support an
award of damages.
Bank of the West at 552.
Essentially, Basic Research contend^ hat because the phrase term "of another"
could be literally interpreted to rut; \« :.. ..lvciusii.:. K;_„ jf anyone otliei than the
i

insi ii e d it mi ist be Iiitei preted tli

•i*•

, \ c 11111 f • 11 f IN > 11 < • , »111i I 1111

Underlying Actuals. *»r M ihe vorj le;r_-t, be Ibmid nnhmuot^
contention and ,; ^nmlii im
integrated don

:

^nrt
* ' •*

Ao nond
•

(i|hlli

*•

\clmiral rejects that

- the policy is looked at as an
ising Iiiji uy " Is ie1 \ e d in

the context of the injuring agreement, it is deal thai the policy covers the insured's
liability for damages "because o f the "personal and advertising injury" offense, which in
this c •: ise is tl u ; i » fl ense of "i lse of ai lothei ' s acl^ ei tising idea."
Mureovci, rather than finding real differences in the case lavv relied upon b>
Admiral, Basic Research either cites factual distinctions that make no difference or

Such suggestions are simply not true. A considered read mi H \\K I asc- shows that all of
the state laws that have been applied to these issues interpret insurance policies exactly as
38
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does Utah. All of the cases cited by Admiral involve policy provisions that are identical
to or are materially indistinguishable from Admiral's policy provision.

All of the

decisions relied upon are well reasoned and consistent with each other and with
Admiral's position.
B.

There Are No Facts Alleged or Presented That Indicate That
Plaintiffs Are Claiming or Could Claim That They Have Been Injured
Because Basic Research Used A Trademark of Western Holdings
Rather Than One of Its Own.
There is nothing in Basic Research's argument referencing any fact, or set of facts,

or otherwise suggesting that any of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claims are premised on the
contention that Basic Research employed someone else's advertising idea and that this
act caused them damage. To the contrary, Basic Research will be liable, if at all, to the
Underlying Plaintiffs without reference to who conceived or owned a trademark on the
taglines/slogans. The liability producing allegations are that the advertising was false,
that Underlying Plaintiffs relied on the false advertising and they were damaged because
the product didn't work as advertised. Under those operative facts, Basic Research will
face liability whether or not the incriminated representations were its own conception or
the conception of someone else.

Those operative alleged facts do not fall within the

scope of coverage of Admiral's policy.
C.

The Class Certification Order
Perhaps foreseeing the problem with its policy interpretation, Basic Research

asserts that the district court's conclusion, that Underlying Plaintiffs' damages resulted
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

not from Basic Research's advertising but from Akavar's failure to perform as advertised,
is refuted by the Wilier/Tompkins court's Class Certification Order [See A OB II \2 ]
This assenion U^K- : . :it,
I he class Certification Order was presented to the trial court w ith a request for
judicial notice four d;n s after oral argument of the cnv. ni- t: *\w Un- xummarv hid-:
and fifty seven days beloic HK *-i Jer was r e n d e r
i

o the district ^ouii. aee

U. R. Civ. P. 7(d) [R 15744592.] Accordingly, it she mid not be considered part of the
evidentiary record for the purposes of the cross-motion for ^immarv , idgiiK a
event -:\

n*x- /< < - ^

-

- •

• -1-

^

.( *

:

[

n any

M

The Certification Order defines the class in the Miller/Tompkins case as: "Persons
who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and
still ••'••M^ weight1 (liunifj the .*.w,u;.. w.tinages period

ll'tom Hns deseriplum I'I.ISIH

Research argues:
The under]vinu complaints allege the class member- were injured or harmed
by Basic Research's USL of advertising phrases because consumers have
been misled into buying Akavar |R 8.28, c>19, *P] |i»14-M.| They do not
allege injury from the class members" failure i<< !*-(. •*.»• vhi ut from the
purchase o f t h r pnulut't ctiKed b\ the ridvertisine

[AOB 20.] Basic Research concludesi
This order is fully consistent with the allegations of the Milicr and lu?h;>h. •*
complaints, in which the class members alleged injuries (parting w
money) arising out ol their purchase of Akavar after seeing or hearing lias ]<v<;e'irrh\ -nK tMii^-ments -, •»r\uniu<j the accused "advertising idea" -
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*

without regard to whether Akavar worked as advertised or whether
they actually lost weight or even tried the product after buying it.
[AOB 20] [emphasis in the original.] This argument, Admiral submits, personifies the
basic misconceptions Basic Research is promoting with respect to advertising injury
liability insurance and the sum and substance of the Underlying Actions.
This Certification Order simply limits those persons who can qualify to be
plaintiffs.

It provides parameters with regard to Basic Research's conduct the

Underlying Plaintiffs must allege or prove in order to establish their claim of liability.
Indeed, as the Court's discussion with respect to the breadth of the class certification
shows, the issue of reliance was omitted due to the need for individual findings on that
issue. In fact, Basic Research argued that the requirement of individual proof of reliance
was a basis for decertifying the class. [R 473.]
In sum, the Certification Order in no way circumscribes the Underlying Plaintiffs'
claims as Basic Research submits. While people who purchased the product but never
used it would be members of the class, they would not have a viable claim. Indeed,
Basic Research points to no allegation that any class representative falls into such a
category.14

Moreover, employing Basic Research's logic, the class would include people who
purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still
lose weight" during the relevant damages period, used it as directed and lost more weight
than they could have possibly imagined. For obvious reasons none of the class
representatives makes such a claim.
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Even if by some stretch of the imagination, pi ; u >• M ,-, c\ iised the product
could recover, their remedies would not be "damages*" as ih.it icrm is used in the Admiral
policy. The remedy wonu \K. K anutu .

nu; \ uicha^ put*

i «K t a]-- a-ilecnvcly,

damages. They are equitable remedies.
^ ° P V a4 ^

In Bank of the Wes? " ?///>cr;r- rv.v,* ^//< .
aildicssnJ lln uranul ,

,

•.

:v,

virtually all forms of monetary relief

'V ~

'

• n*-_c- urpi^i r:

I 'he Court rejected the argument, noting that

'[i]t is well established "that one may n.»i Insure against ?1u risk of being ordered to
return mom

or nropert^ ...... :.„.. aeon wront: !,JI> ,iu r in .,

'damages' ;r ih,»i vi

•.

. :

• >..•"

.

.;•, ; a.icrs do not award
•

'*. -

f i 833 I ' 2< I

at 553 (and cases cited therein).
I he Court further noted that "[i]f insurance coverage were available for monetary

would simph -in'• ;nc u ^ u, his mauler ~nd, in LIL^U, ;CIUI*A «*w proceeds ui m^
unlau hn ,'oinjiH i *MU h n result would be inconsistent with the act's deterrent purpose.
Bank of 'the W rest at 553.

.•

As to claims for injunctive relief, the California Supreme Cour t held in AID Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court

^ Cal 3d 807 838 (Calif 1990), that the cc >sts of injunctive

rt.'lid wtidhn nil mi' d UH piuphvlailu , mitigative, or remedial purposes, do not readil)
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satisfy the statutory or dictionary definitions of "damages." Because such costs are paid
to employees or independent contractors rather than aggrieved parties, they do not
directly "compensate" aggrieved persons for "loss" or "detriment."

When one looks at

the provisions of the policy Insuring Agreement, inclusive of the definitions, the only
reasonable interpretation is that the policy covers the insured's liability to a party that
claims to have sustained harm because of the insured's use of that party's advertising idea
in the insured's advertisement. That interpretation is consistent with the basic promise of
any liability policy which is to protect the insured from judgments that encompass
damages caused by offenses that are within the promises made in the contract. That
interpretation is supported by the decisions in Westfield, Trailer Bridge and Rose Acre.
D.

Exclusion "g" Precludes Coverage
If the allegations fall within a policy exclusion, there is no duty to defend. See

Deseret Fed. Co. supra., 714 P.2d at 1147 ("Conversely, where there is no potential
liability [due to the fact that the allegations fall within the scope of an exclusion], there is
no duty to defend any underlying lawsuit."). Basic Research again parses words from
dictionary definitions to attempt to avoid the clear conclusion that the exclusion for
'"personal and advertising injury' arising out of the failure of goods, products or services
to conform with any statement of quality or performance made in your 'advertisement'"
is applicable. [AOB 45-46.]
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The essence of the Underlying l*laintills' claims is that the) read the
advertisement, bought the product, took it as directed and didn't lose weight. It is hard
to imagine how si ich clain is fail to i eflect on the quality or performance of. W; ar
E.

The DISH Network € < m r
Basic Research points out that the district court decision in DISH Network Corp. v,

10 Circuit. DISH Network ^urp. v. Arch Specialty m&. i c , bj^ f.j>d

!;.'

;

2011) (interpreting Colorado hmV From this reversal Basic research asserts that "b)
repealed
Judp

C;:HIL ..IKS

! *' ^ ei

i.c^vii; 1^-. UIL. wi.

- ir-r-: • -;'o .»

-

iu. *ti>inct coin* t decision

.

.• f / Network,

In: iterpi etation

advertising idea' to mean ""wrongful taking of another's advertising idea."* [AOB 23-24.]
in auualii). ihcrL1 i>. Homme in the Tenth Circuit Court decision that in any fashion
impi igns Judge De \ rer's anal)' sis
DISH /\" et H i v k raised if i s issi i * : f

\ v 1 letl i "i a liability

policy - co v e ring

"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" could cover a patent
infringement case. In reviewing an extensive amount of case law, the court noted that the

with products the insured happened to advertise, rather than a means of advertising =:
the insured used to market its own products
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The court found, by contrast, that Dish allegedly committed patent infringement
by using RAKTL's technology to sell Dish's own non-infringing satellite television
products and services. It sided with the several courts considering similar facts, that have
affirmatively held that where an advertising technique itself is patented, its infringement
may constitute advertising injury. The ultimate conclusion was that there were sufficient
allegations and extrinsic evidence to create the possibility that there was a
misappropriation of advertising ideas:
Because we conclude that the complaint potentially alleges advertising
injury arising from the misappropriation of advertising ideas, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1014. In supporting its conclusion, the Court noted:
More specifically, however, the complaint may be read to allege actions
that misappropriated patented advertising ideas, insofar as the product at
issue was designed expressly for product promotion and dissemination of
advertising information.
Id. at 1022
Of interest is the fact that one of the defendants, Arch Specialty, had the newer
policy language employed in the Admiral policy. Other than mentioning that the Arch
Specialty policy covered the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement",
the court did not address that language. One suspects that this circumstance is because
the Arch Specialty policy had a patent infringement exclusion, an issue that was going to
be addressed on remand.
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In sum, 'the Tenth Circuit did precisely what Judge Dever did.

\U* ^

> the

underlying complaints to see if anything had been alleged that woul IK covered if

Admiral Personal and Advertising Liability Coverage is applicable.
CONCLUSION
Wiiiiiiil u'siKVlliill1, ivi|iir.ls illiiill tin iili'flinl MIIIII1 i.'iiinl (il suimnim in lll.t" m
of Admiral should be affirmed.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2012.
Ci IRIS i ENSEN & JENSEN, P C.

Phillip S. Ferguson
Rebecca I,. Hill
David J. Garthe [Pro Hac V ice]
Boornazian Jensen & Garthe
555 12th Street, Suite 1800
Oakland, California 9460 7
Attorneys for Admiral Insurance Co.
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(1) I he I elcphone Cons urn erft-otectionAct
(TCPA), including any amendment of or addition to such law; or

"Property damage" ta "impaired property" or
property that has not been pbysicaDy injured arts
ingoutof:

(2) The CAN-SPAM Art of.2003, .including any
amendment of or addition to such law; or

(1) A delect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in "your product* or "your work";

(3) Any statute, ordmance or regukricn, other
than the TCPA or CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,
that prohibits or limits the sending, ttassmitting, conmumicaring or distribution of material of information.

€1

(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on
your behalf to perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its leans.

Exclusions, c* through n, 'do not apply to damage by. fire
to premises while rented to you or temporarily occu*
pied by you with permission of the owner, A separate
limit of tnsurance applies to this coverage as described
in Section III ~ Limits Qf Insurance.

This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of
other property arising out of sudden and accidental
physical injuryto"your product" or "your work"
after it has been put to its intended use.
in. Ret a 1 Of P r od u c f s, W nrk O r I m pa ired
Properly
Damages claimed for 'any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement adjustment,, removal or disposal of

COVERAGE B-FERSONA.L AND ADVERTISING
MJURYIJABIIJTY
1. Insuring Agreement

(1). n four product";
(2) "Your work-; or
(3) "Impaired property";
if such product,. ,"workr or property is withdrawn or
recalled from the market or from use by any person or organizarios because of a known or suspected" defect,, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in it
©. Personal And Advertising Injury
"Bodily injury" arising out of "personal and adver
rising injury",
p.

Electronic Data
Damages arising out of the loss of* loss of use 0f,
damajge to, corruption o£ mabiliry to access, or inability1tomanipulate electronic data.
As used in this exclusion, electronic data means informatioo,fesctsor progranis stored as or on, created Or used on, or transmitted &iw--&pm:GQQ&
put^r software, includingsystems and applications
software, hard or Soppy disks* CD-ROMS, tapes,
drives, cells, data processing devices orany other
media which are used with electronically controlled equipment

tfc. ]>iStittbiSdii Of'Mate rial In 'I tciiaf'Mii Of
Statute*
*Bodi^y mjury" of "pmperfy damage* arising direcrly or mdirectfy out ofany action or omission
that violates or is alleged to violate;

1 1, itfiftt I'5II?

* m.i-jlies inc

JU We- will pay those sums- thai the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"personai and advertising injury" to which mis
insurance applies. We will have therightand duty
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking
those damages. However, we will have no doty 10
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking
damages for "persona I and advertising injury* to
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at
our discretion, investigate any offense and settle
any claim or "suit* that may result. But*
(1) The amount we will pay for damages is limited as described in Section HI - limits Of
Insurance; and
(2) Our right and duty to defend end w ucu w r
have used up the applicable Emit of msunm .*
in me payment of judgments or settlements
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses
under Coverage C.
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is Covered unless expficitly
provided for under -Supplementary Payments Coverage^ A and B.
b. This insurance applies to "personal and advertising
injury caused by an difense -arising: out ofyour
busmess, but only if;
(1) Ilie'offisBSe'was-.cxmimitteci in, the "coverage
territory";
(2) The offense was not committed!, before the- *
Retroactive Date, if any, shown in the Declamtipns or after the eod of the -policy period;
and

l«>6
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Our obligation to defexid an insured's indemnitee and to'
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation expenses as Supplementary Payments ends when we have
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the payment ofjudgments or settlements or the conditions set
forth above, or the terms ofthe agreement described in
Paragraph f« above, are no longer met.

(a) To you, to your partners or members (if
you are a partnership or joim venture), to
your members (If you are a limited liability company), to a cc^eanployee" while
* in the course of his or her employment or
perfoiming duties related to the conduct
of your business, or to your other "volunteer workers" while perfonning duties related to the conduct of your business;

SECTION D - WHO IS AN INSURED
1* If you are designated in the Declarations as:

(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or
sister of that co-'employee" or "volunteer
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph
(a) above;

a. An individual, you and your spouse are insureds,
but only with resjpeci to the conduct of a business
of which you are the sole owner.
b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured.
Your members, your partners, and their spouses
are also insureds, but only with respecttothe conduct of your business.
c.

A limited liability company, you are an insured
Your members are also insureds, bat only with respect to me conduct of your business. Your managers are insureds, but only with respect to their
duties as your managers.

<L An organization other than a partnership^ joint
venture or limited liability company, you are an insured. Your "executive officers" and directors are
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
your officers or directors. Your stockholders are
also insureds, but only with respect to their habtlity as stockholders.
e,

A trust, you are an insured. Your trustees ate also
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
trustees.

2. Each of thefollowingis also an insured:
a. Your "volunteer worJoers" only while perforjoaing
duties relaled to the conduct of your business, or
your "employees", other than either your ^executive officers'* (if you are an organization other than
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability
company) or your managers (tf you are a limited
liability coinpany), but onlyforacts within the
scope of theiremptoyrQeat by ypU or while performing duties related to the conduct of your business. However, none of these "eixmk>yees* of
"volunteer workers" are msureds for;
(1J "Bodily ittpary*- or "persona! and advertising
injury1*:

CG 06 02 12 07

Page 15 of 65

(e) For which there is any obligation to share
damages with or repay someone else who
must pay damages because of the injury
described in Paragraphs (a) or (b) above;
or
(d) Arising out of his or her providing or felling to provide professional health care
services.
(2) "Property damage" to property:
(a) Owned, occupied or used by,
(b) Rented to, in the care, custody or control
o£ or over which physical control is being exercised for any purpose by
you, any of your '"employees", "volunteer
workers", any partner or member (if you are a
partnership or joint venture), or any member
(if you are a limited liability company).
than your "employee* or "vol*>, Any person (other
0
unteer worker ) or any organization while acting
as your real estate managerv

Any person or organization having proper temporary custody of your property if you die, but only:
(1) With respect to Kabihiy arlsmg out of me
maintenance, or use of that property; and
(2) Until your legalrepresentativehas been ap^
pointed.
Your legal repacesentatrvedf you dk, but only with
respect to duties as sock that represrajtative will
have all your rights and duties under mis Coverage
Part
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Effective Date: 08/20/2008

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

NAMED INNlIKHI> ENDORSEMENT
This endorsement modifies- insurance provided under-the folio wing:
:t )MMERICAL_GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART'
. j K agreed tbe Named Insured as shown on the Common-Policy DecI.arati.OB5 is as follows:

COVARIXLLC
DBA; BASIC RESEARCH LLC;
OOVARIX, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
WESTERN HOLDINGS, I LC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
COMMAND ENTERPRISE, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
PC MANAGEMENT AND S! JBSIDI ARIES;
5742 HOUSINGS LLC

AD'.07 8501 95 "

-
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12. Plaintiff, Donna Patterson, is a resident of Washington, D C . In or around
August 2007, Ms. Patterson observed an advertisement for Akavar published in a national
women's magazine that she read while at a hair salon in Washington, D C . The
advertisement, wrhich contained the image of a female model, touted Akavar as a new
" E U R O P E A N W E I G H T LOSS B R E A K T H R O U G H " that had fast acting caloric
restriction. (A copy of an Akavar advertisement containing the image of a female model
similar to that viewed by Ms. Patterson is attached hereto as Exhibit B). The advertisement
also stated that one could "EAT ALL Y O U W A N T & STILL L O S E W E I G H T .
Based upon this advertising by Defendants, Ms. Patterson purchased a supply of Akavar
from a General Nutrition Center store located in Arlington, Virginia, for approximately
$40.00. After 30 days of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Patterson
had lost no weight, and she ceased taking the product.
Defendant Basic Research
13. Defendant Basic Research is a limited liability company established under the
laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold
Gatty Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116.
14. Basic Research claims that is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the
United States with annual sales revenues in excess of $50 million. Basic Research develops,
manufactures and markets scores of cosmetics, nutritional supplements and dietary
supplements that are marketed under the names of nearly a dozen limited liability companies
that have been formed by Defendants. Upon information and belief, Basic Research
conducts business under, or is directly affiliated with, each of these limited liability
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
M.D. Tennessee,
Nashville Division.
CLARCOR, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 3:10-00336.
Dec. 16,2010.
Robert Earl Boston, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Rebecca Brinkley, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis,
LLP, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff/Defendant.
April T. Villaverde, Margaret F. Catalano, Carroll,
McNulty & Kull, LLC, Basking Ridge, NJ, Randall
Chadwell Ferguson, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings,
Nashville, TN, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR., District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff, Clarcor, Inc., a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Tennessee, filed
this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diversity statute, against the Defendant, Columbia Casualty
Company, an insurance company organized and existing under the laws of Illinois with its principal place
of business in Illinois. Plaintiff asserts claims of
breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, ("TCPA"), Tenn.Code Ann. $$
47-18-101 et seq., and violation of the Tennessee Bad
Faith Act Statute, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 56-7-105 et seq.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment on whether under
Defendant's insurance policy, the Defendant owed a
duty to defend and indemnify Plaintiff under the policy for claims in a prior action against Plaintiff.
Before the Court are Plaintiffs motion for partial
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 14) and Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment (Docket
Entry No. 28). In its motion, Plaintiff contends that
some of the claims and allegations in 3M's complaint
fall within the "personal and advertising injury" cov-

erage in Defendant's policy. Plaintiff also contends
that Defendant has a duty to indemnify it for the
damages that Plaintiff will have to pay in connection
with its settlement with 3M. In its motion, Defendant
argues that 3M's complaint only contains claims for
false advertising under state and federal law and
Plaintiff erroneously recharacterizes 3M's claims and
allegations in an effort to qualify under the policy's
"personal and advertising injury" coverage. Further,
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs claims are also
barred by the "failure to conform" exclusion in the
policy and 3M's complaint does not satisfy the terms
of the "personal and advertising injury" coverage.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment
should be granted because the allegations and claims
in the underlying action did not state claims covered
under the Defendant's policy. The claims in the prior
action were excluded under the failure to conform
exclusion in the Defendant's policy.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 3 1 1
FN1. Upon a motion for summary judgment,
the factual contentions are viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment. Duchon v.
Caion Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986).
As will be discussed infra, upon the filing of
a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forth with sufficient
evidence to withstand a motion for directed
verdict, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Ml U.S.
242, 247-52,106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
£1986}, particularly where there has been an
opportunity for discovery. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because there are not
any material factual disputes, this section
constitutes
findings
of
fact
under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).
Plaintiff obtained a commercial general liability
insurance policy from the Defendant, number
0223304983, with effective dates from December 1,
2008 to December 1, 2009 (the "Policy"). (Docket
Entry No. 37, Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 2
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5211607 (MD.Tenn.)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D.Tenn.))
Statement of Undisputed Facts, at ^ 1). This Policy
states, in relevant part, under COVERAGE B
PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY, that:
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend
the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply. [... ]
*2 b. This insurance applies to "personal and advertising injury" caused by an offense arising out of
your business but only if the offense was committed
in the "coverage territory" during the policy period.
SECTION V-DEFINITIONS
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast
or published to the general public or specific market
segments about your goods, products or services for
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters.
For the purposes of this definition:
a. Notices that are published include material placed
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of
communication; and
b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site
that is about your goods, products or services for the
purposes of attracting customers or supporters is
considered as advertisement.

lessor;
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that ... or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services;
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that violates a person's right of privacy;
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
"advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade
dress or slogan in your "advertisement".
Id. at \ 3 (emphasis added by Plaintiff). .
In addition, the policy contains the following
relevant exclusion claim:
(g) Quality Or Performance Of Goods-Failure
To Conform To Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or performance made in your "advertisement".
(Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 2 at 8).
On August 14, 2009, 3M Company ("3M") filed
an action against a Clarcor subsidiary in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 3M Company v. Clarcor Air Filtration Prods.,
Inc., 1:09-cv-00909. (Docket Entry No. 37 at f 4). 3M
summarized its claim in its complaint:

* **
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury,
including consequential "bodily injury", arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into,
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies,
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or

Through this Complaint, brought under the false
advertising provisions of the federal Lanham Act
and the Virginia False Advertising Statute, 3M
seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring Purolator to stop its false claims, to cease
and desist from its predatory, false advertising
campaign, and to pay damages to 3M based on these
violations.
(Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at 2). 3M's
complaint specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as
follows:
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H 17. Clarcor designed the packaging and advertising for its new line of Purolator filters to resemble
that of 3M's Filtrete line in several key aspects, in an
evident scheme to parasitize the excellent reputation
of 3M's Filtrete products. Specific examples of the
ways in which Clarcor is attempting to accomplish
this, by using various false and misleading advertising claims, are set forth in detail below.

***
CLARCOR'S FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING CLAIMS
False Comparative Performance Claims
*3 U 25. In furtherance of its predatory scheme to
take retail shelf space and market share away from
3M, Clarcor designed the packaging for Purolator
products to convey the false and misleading claims
that Purolator filters perform equally to, if not better
than, 3M's Filtrete filters. Several aspects of the
Purolator package design create this false impression, including the numerical performance claims of
"overall filtration efficiency," the claimed "respiratory protection factor," and similarities in color.
H 26. For example, one of 3M's line of Filtrete filters
is called the "Ultra Allergen" and is sold in a purple
package that labels the filter as "90% effective at
attracting and capturing large airborne allergens
like: pollen, mold spores and dust mite debris." ...
% 27. Clarcor has recently launched its own
purple "Allergen" filter, which it claims on the
package provides u97% Overall Filtration Efficiency" (emphasis added) [emphasis in complaint] ...
11 28. Consumers seeing these competing package
claims will undoubtedly be led to believe that the
Purolator purple filter is even more efficient at removing particles from the air than the 3M Ultra
Allergen filter. The Purolator filter is claimed to
remove 97% of all particles ("97% Overall Filtration Efficiency"). By contrast, the 3M filter is labeled to remove only 90% of large particles ("90%
effective at attracting and capturing large airborne
allergens...."). As set forth below, Purolator's
claim of 97% Overall Filtration Efficiency is not
only literally false, it creates a false impression of
superiority to 3M's Ultra Allergen filter. Both
false claims are conclusively disproven by testing
at leading independent labs.

11 29. Clarcor's misleading claims of similarity between the 3M and Purolator filters do not stop there.
As shown in Figure 1 above, 3M labels its filters
with a Microparticle Performance Rating ("MPR"),
a metric designed by 3M to inform consumers how
well each filter in its Filtrete product line performs
relative to other Filtrete filters in the line. For example, 3M's purple Filtrete "Ultra Allergen" filter is
labeled with an MPR of 1250. 3M's red Filtrete
"Micro Allergen" filter is labeled with an MPR of
1000. Other filters in the Filtrete line are labeled
with MPRs ranging from 300 to 2200.
1) 30. It is no coincidence that Clarcor labels its
Purolator purple Allergen filter with what is plainly
intended to be a comparable numerical performance
value. Although Clarcor calls its metric the "Respiratory Protection Factor" ("RPF"), it chose to assign the very same number-1250-to its purple Allergen filter that 3M used in connection with its
purple Filtrete filter, thus, directly copying 3M's key
MPR performance metric for the analogous product.
Purolator's adoption of the exact same number used
by 3M on its own purple package leads both retailers and consumers to believe the Purolator product
filters the air as well as the 3M product.
*4 K 31. Finally, Clarcor intentionally adopted the
color purple for its Purolator Allergen filter. 3M's
Ultra Allergen filter package exemplifies 3M's use
of specific colors to convey the various efficiency
levels of 3M's filters. Clarcor's choice of purple,
along with the false claim of 97% Overall Filtration
Efficiency and the RPF of 1250 collectively imply
to consumers that the purple Purolator filter is equal
to or better than the purple 3M filter, and that consumers switching to Purolator will experience no
decline in performance if they buy the Purolator
filter instead of the 3M filter.
K 32. Purolator's monadic and comparative
performance claims are false. Testing of both
brands offiltersby two leading, independent testing
laboratories, proves that Purolator's purple Allergen
filters are significantly inferior to Filtrete's purple
Ultra Allergen filters in their ability to filter all
measured sizes of particles from the air. In particular, the Purolator filters perform far worse in their
ability to filter the smallest particles, such as smoke
and bacteria, which are important contributors to
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poor indoor air quality. Thus, Purolator's implied
comparative performance claims to 3M Filtrete
are false. Testing also demonstrates that
Purolator's claims ofu Overall Filtration Efficiency" are literally false, standing alone.
^ 33. Clarcor's false implied claims are not limited to the purple Purolator filter, but also apply
to other Purolator products. Specifically, 3M's
red Filtrete filter, called the "Micro Allergen," is
labeled to have an MPR of 1000. Purolator offers a
red filter as well, labeled with an RPF of 1050, and
as having an Overall Filtration Efficiency of 95%.
In this manner the packaging and advertising for the
red Purolator filter also mimics aspects of the
packaging and claims for the red Filtrete filters to
create the false impression of superior performance
to Filtrete. As with the purple filters, testing of both
brands of red filters by two leading, independent
testing laboratories proves that Purolator's red filters
are not superior to Filtrete's red Micro Allergen
filters in their ability to filter all measured sizes of
particles from the air.
^ 34. Purolator's use of Filtrete's color scheme, RPF
ratings similar to Filtrete's MPR ratings, and overstated Overall Filtration Efficiency claims are factors likely to be material to consumers on the market
for home HVAC filters. Upon information and belief, consumers select their home HVAC filters
based on the color, RPF or MPR rating, and Overall
Filtration Efficiency claims, upon other factors.

* **
H 63. The false and misleading advertising claims
described in paragraphs 1-62 above will, if allowed to continue, profoundly hurt 3M,s sales of
home HVAC filters and irreparably harm its
market share and reputation in the category.
Filtrete filters have already been removed from
shelves at some Lowe's stores. If Clarcor's scheme
is successful, 3Mfiltersmay be removedfrommany
more Lowe's stores in the near future. Once 3M
loses its presence on store shelves in this manner, it
will be highly difficult, if not impossible for 3M to
regain.

* **
*51 65. As a direct and proximate result of all of
Clarcor's false claims on its Purolator packaging and
advertising, as detailed in paragraphs 1 through 62

above, 3M has suffered harm, including lost sales and
loss of market share, due to retail stores removing
Filtrete products from their shelves to make room for
Purolator filters, has lost goodwill in the marketplace,
and has suffered damage in reputation in the marketplace. Unless this Court enjoins Clarcor from continuing its false advertising, 3M will continue to suffer
further irreparable harm in the future. 3M, therefore,
seeks an immediate stop to Clarcor's false claims,
through withdrawal of the offending packaging from
the market.
Id. at 5, 7-11, 19-20, Attachment 3 (emphasis
added). For relief, 3M sought, among other things,
D. Orders enjoining Clarcor from copying elements
of the packaging and design of Filtrete filters
packaging in a manner that reasonably suggests or
implies that the two products are equivalent in
performance, or that the Purolator filter is superior
to the 3M filter, when they are not....
Orders enjoining Clarcor from disseminating or
causing the dissemination of the following false
claims in any packaging, advertising, radio or television commercials, or other promotional activities
or materials for its Purolator filters ... [.]
Id. at 23.
Plaintiff timely requested insurance coverage for
3M's action that the Defendant acknowledged on
August 21, 2009. (Docket Entry No. 37 at ] 6). On
October 9, 2009, 3M filed a motion for preliminary
injunction, asserting the 'literally false" standard for
Plaintiffs alleged false advertising. Id. at \\ 7-8. The
district court denied 3M's motion for preliminary
injunction on its "literally false" theory and concluded
that 3M had not shown a likelihood to succeed on "its
literal falsity claim." Id. at fl 9-10; Docket Entry No.
14, attachment No. 5 at p. 68. The district court stated:
The Court cannot conclude that there's a likelihood
of success in proving a lack of any reliable data to
support the MERV ratings with respect to either the
blue or the red. It would require more information
than the Court has before it, including the nature of
the tests, conditions under which those tests were
conducted, and basically to make a scientific finding as to the results of each test.
When that's compared with the data that was-the
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testing that Clarcor itself conducted is corroborated,
at least to a certain extent, by the 3M testing, the
Court must conclude that 3M has not made a clear
showing of likelihood of succe [ss] on ... its literal
falsity claim.
(Docket Entry No. 14 at Attachment No. 5 at p.
68).
On October 16,2009, Defendant notified Plaintiff
of its intention to disclaim any obligation to defend or
indemnify Clarcor in connection with the 3M action.
(Docket Entry No. 14 at Attachment 7). Defendant
cited, among others, Plaintiffs policy's provisions on
its failure to conform exclusion. Id. at 12. Plaintiff
responded with letters dated October 30, 2009, and
December 23, 2009, disputing Defendant's position.
Id., Attachments 8 and 10. By letters dated November
10, 2009, and January 28, 2009, the Defendant reaffirmed its denial of coverage. Id., Attachments 9 and
11.
*6 Plaintiff defended the 3M action at its cost and
settled the 3M action by entering into a confidential
settlement agreement with 3M. (Docket Entry No. 37
at T| 12). The settlement agreement did not require
Clarcor to pay damages to a third party. Id. at f 13;
(Docket Entry No. 16, Settlement Agreement).
Clarcor, however, must, among other things, package
and repackage certain of its products and devise a new
numbering or rating system for its filters' effectiveness. Id.
II. CONCLUSIONS O F LAW
"The very mission of the summary judgment
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need
for trial." Advisor y Committee Notes on Rule 56,
Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules (West
Ed. 1989). Moreover, "district courts are widely
acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary
judgment sua sponte, so long as the opposing party
was on notice that [he] had to come forward with all of
[his] evidence/' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986);
accord, Routman v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc.,
873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1989).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 411 U.S. 242,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United
States Supreme Court explained the nature of a morion

for summary judgment:
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." By its very terms, this standard provides that
the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify
which facts are material. Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original and
added in part). Earlier the Supreme Court defined a
material fact for Rule 56 purposes as "[w]here the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
'genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587,
106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations
omitted).
A motion for summary judgment is to be considered after adequate time for discovery. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 326 (1986). Where there has been a reasonable
opportunity for discovery, the party opposing the
motion must make an affirmative showing of the need
for additional discovery after the filing of a motion for
summary judgment. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d
351, 355-57 (6th Cir.1989). But see Routman v. Automatic Data Processing. Inc.. 873 F.2d 970, 971 (6th
Cir.1989).
*7 There is a certain framework in considering a
summary judgment motion as to the required showing
of the respective parties, as described by the Court in
Celotex:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
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district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.... [W]e find no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim..
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis deleted).
As the Court of Appeals explained, "[t]he moving
party bears the burden of satisfying Rule 56(c) standards." Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239, n. 4 (6th
Cir.1986). The moving party's burden is to show
"clearly and convincingly" the absence of any genuine
issues of material fact. Sims v. Memphis Processors,
Inc., 926 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Kochins v. Linden-Alimak Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th
Cir.1986)). "So long as the movant has met its initial
burden of 'demonstrating] the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact,7 the nonmoving party then
'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial/ " Emmons, 874 F.2d at 353
(quoting Celotex and Rule 56(e)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit warned that "the respondent must adduce more
than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion
[and]... must 'present affirmative evidence in order to
defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.' " Street v. J.C Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d
1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Liberty Lobby ).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that:
The respondent must "do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find" for the respondent, the motion should be
granted. The trial court has at least some discretion
to determine whether the respondent's claim is
"implausible."
Street. 886 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted). See
also Hutt v. Gibson Fiber Glass Products, 914 F.2d
790,792 (6th Cir.1990) ("A court deciding a motion
for summary judgment must determine 'whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law/ ") (quoting
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
If both parties make their respective showings,
the Court then determines if the material factual dispute is genuine, applying the governing law.
More important for present purposes, summary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material
fact is "genuine, " that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.
*8....
Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are
convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed
verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the
trial on the merits. If the defendant in a
run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack
of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably
favors one side or the other but whether a
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the
plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find
for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict- "whether there is
[evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed
to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon
whom the onus of proof is imposed. "
Liberty* Lobby. All U.S. at 248, 252 (citation
omitted and emphasis added).
It is likewise true that:
In ruling on [a] motion for summary judgment, the
court must construe the evidence in its most favorable light in favor of the party opposing the motion
and against the movant. Further, the papers supporting the movant are closely scrutinized, whereas
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the opponent's are indulgently treated.
It has been stated that: 'The purpose of the hearing
on the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve
factual issues. It is to determine whether there is any
genuine issue of material fact in dispute....'

trilogy of leading Supreme Court decisions, and other
authorities on summary judgment and synthesized ten
rules in the "new era" on summary judgment motions:
1. Complex cases are not necessarily inappropriate
for summary judgment.

Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King
Corp.. 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6th Cir.1962) (citations
omitted). As the Sixth Circuit stated, "[a]ll facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion" Duchon v. Caion Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th
Or. 1986).

2. Cases involving state of mind issues are not
necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit further explained the District
Court's role in evaluating the proof on a summary
judgment motion:

4. This burden may be met by pointing out to the
court that the respondent, having had sufficient
opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

A district court is not required to speculate on which
portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor
is it obligated to wade through and search the entire
record for some specific facts that might support the
nonmoving party's claim. Rule 56 contemplates a
limited marshalling of evidence by the nonmoving
party sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. This marshalling of evidence,
however, does not require the nonmoving party to
"designate" facts by citing specific page numbers.
Designate means simply ctto point out the location
of." Webster's Third New InterNational Dictionary
(1986).
Of course, the designated portions of the record
must be presented with enough specificity that the
district court can readily identify the facts upon
which the nonmoving party relies; but that need for
specificity must be balanced against a party's need
to be fairly apprised of how much specificity the
district court requires. This notice can be adequately
accomplished through a local court rule or a pretrial
order.
*9 InterRoval Corp. v. Sponseller. 889 F.2d 108,
111 (6th Cir.1989). Here, the parties have given some
references to the proof upon which they rely. Local
Rules 56.01 (b)-(d) require a showing of undisputed
and disputed facts.
In Street, the Court of Appeals discussed the

3. The movant must meet the initial burden of
showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's
case.

5. A court should apply a federal directed verdict
standard in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The inquiry on a summary judgment motion
or a directed verdict motion is the same: "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law"
6. As on federal directed verdict motions, the
"scintilla rule" applies, i.e., the respondent must
adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion.
7. The substantive law governing the case will determine what issues of fact are material, and any
heightened burden of proof required by the substantive law for an element of the respondent's case,
such as proof by clear and convincing evidence,
must be satisfied by the respondent.
8. The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the
trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a
disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment."
9. The trial court no longer has the duty to search the
entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine
issue of material fact.
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10. The trial court has more discretion than in the
"old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence.
The respondent must "do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find" for the respondent, the motion should be
granted. The trial court has at least some discretion
to determine whether the respondent's claim is
"implausible."
Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-80 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Court has distilled from these collective
holdings four issues that are to be addressed upon a
motion for summary judgment: (1) has the moving
party "clearly and convincingly" established the absence of material facts?; (2) if so, does the plaintiff
present sufficient facts to establish all the elements of
the asserted claim or defense?; (3) if factual support is
presented by the nonmoving party, are those facts
sufficiently plausible to support a jury verdict or
judgment under the applicable law?; and (4) are there
any genuine factual issues with respect to those material facts under the governing law?

pleading test for determination of the duty to defend is
based exclusively on the facts as alleged rather than on
the facts as they actually are...." St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 835
(Tenn.1994) (citation omitted). The "plaintiff has the
burden of proving that its damages are covered by the
terms of the policy; the defendant, in turn, must establish the applicability of any exclusions on which it
relies." Charles Hampton's A-1 Signs, Inc. v. Am.
States
Ins.
Co..
225
S.W.3d
482,
487
(Tenn.Ct.App.2006).
Under Tennessee law, the Court's inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint in the cited
act
ion. Drexel Chem. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 933
S.W.2d471 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996V
If even one of the allegations is covered by the
policy, the insurer has a duty to defend, irrespective
of the number of allegations that may be excluded
by the policy. An insurer may not properly refuse to
defend an action against its insured unless "it is
plain from the face of the complaint that the allegations fail to state facts that bring the case within or
potentially within the policy's coverage."
Id. at 480 (citations omitted).

*10 In this diversity action, the Court applies the
substantive law of the forum state, including the forum's choice of law rules. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
Without a choice-of-law provision in the policy, the
Court concludes that Tennessee law applies to this
action where the insurance policy was issued and
delivered in Tennessee. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Chester-O'Donley & Assocs., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 1, 5
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). Tennessee courts construe any
ambiguities in an insurance policy in favor of the
insured. Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d
195, 200 (Tenn.2000). Yet, if the terms of the policy
are clear, the Court enforces insurance contracts "according to their plain terms" with the language construed in its "plain, ordinary and popular sense." Id. In
a word, Tennessee courts do not create a new insurance contract for the parties. Id.

In analyzing these coverage claims, Tennessee
law also considers the gravamen of the factual allegations and claims.

"An insurer's duty to defend is separate and distinct from the insurer's obligation to pay claims under
the policy. The duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify." Id. (citation omitted). "In any event, the

*11 Under the policy at issue, the Defendant "will
have the right and duty to defend [PlaintiffJ against
any 'suit' see king [personal and advertising injury

"It would be inappropriate for us to conduct a
word-by-word analysis of the complaint, patching
one word from one paragraph to another word from
another paragraph, because such a review might
very well cause us to find meaning where none
otherwise existed. The proper extent of our review
simply requires us to focus attention on the facts
alleged as they appear in the complaint to determine
if they could even potentially be covered by the
[insurer]."
Insura Property and Cos. Ins. Co. v. Ashe, No.
M2002-00374-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 253255, at *4
(6th Cir. Feb. 6.2003) (citation omitted).
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liability] damages." Thus, Defendant's duty was triggered (1) if the 3M litigation were a "suit" seeking
"damages" (2) the action was for "personal and advertising injury liability", and (3) coverage was not
barred by the policy's exclusion provision. Defendant
does not contest that the 3M action constituted a "suit"
under the policy. Defendant contends that 3M's claims
were only for false advertising that is not covered
under the policy. Plaintiff contends that the 3M complaint alleged a "personal and advertising injury"
claim of disparagement, "use of another's advertising
idea in your 4advertisement,' " and either trade dress
or slogan infringement. Plaintiff does not dispute that
false advertising claims are not covered under the
policy.
As a general observation and consistent with
principles in Insura, the Court concludes that 3M's
claims were for false advertising. 3M's complaint
asserted claims for false advertising under the federal
Lanham Act and the Virginia False Advertising statute. 3M sought preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief requiring Plaintiff to cease and desist from
Plaintiffs alleged predatory, false advertising campaign, and to pay damages to 3M based on those violations. (Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at 2). The
elements of a Lanham Act claim for false advertising
are that: (1) the defendant made false or misleading
statements of fact concerning his product or another's;
(2) the statement actually or tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; (3) the
statement is material in that it will likely influence the
deceived consumer's purchasing decisions; (4) the
advertisements were introduced into interstate commerce; and (5) there is some causal link between the
challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Exports,
Inc.. 270 F.3d 298. 323(6th Cir.2001).
The 3M complaint contains numerous headings
and sub-headings referring to Clarcor's false advertising. The principal heading described "CLARCOR'S
FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING
CLAIMS" and the sub-headings were: "False Comparative Performance Claims;" "False 'Overal Filtration Efficiency' Claims;" "False Claims of Certification or Compliance With Government Standard;" and
"False MERV Ratings." (Docket Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at 7, 11, 14, 18, fl 25-62).
Applying Insura, the Court concludes that 3M's

complaint presented claims for false advertising and
such claims are not covered by the Defendant's policy.
A. Disparagement
Plaintiff cites paragraphs 17, 25, 28-31, 33, 63
and 65 in 3M's complaint as setting forth claims as
disparagement claims. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines disparagement as follows:
One who publishes a. false statement harmful to the
interest of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for
publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely
to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false
or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
*12 Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Levine, No.
3:05-0240, 2005 WL 1799305, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. July
27, 2005) (quoting Section 623A, "Liability for Publication of Injurious Falsehood-General Principle")
(emphasis added).
Yet, the cited portions of 3M's complaint allege
that Clarcor made false statements about Clarcor's
product. Such factual allegations do not state a cognizable claim for disparagement. See Duramax Marine LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of III, No. 03-3500,
2004 WL 1759146, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug.3, 2004)
(holding that the underlying complaint did not contain
a claim for disparagement since it only alleged that the
insured made "false statements about [the insured's]
own products-not that [the insured] made false statements about [the underlying plaintiffs] products.");
see also Gibson Guitar. 2005 WL 1799305, at *2
(finding no disparaging statement where defendant
was only promoting its product).
B. Use of Another's Advertising Idea
Plaintiff next cites paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and
33-34 of 3M's complaint as arguably stating a claim
for the ctuse of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.7 " Specifically, Plaintiff contends that
3M's allegations of Clarcor's packaging and advertising ideas, such as the color scheme and numerical
rating system, were 3M's ideas. When read in conjunction with 3M's remaining allegations in the cited
paragraphs, Plaintiff contends that a claim covered by
Defendant's policy, is stated. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff recharacterizes 3M's claims as involving an
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"advertising idea" by selectively choosing words and
phrases from various sections of 3M's complaint.
Defendant contends that the mere fact that 3M's
complaint alleges facts establishing Clarcor's false
comparative advertising-in the context of a false advertising count-is insufficient to constitute a claim for
wrongful use of another's advertising idea.
An "Advertising idea" has been defined as "an
idea for advertising that is 'novel and new/ and
'definite and concrete/ such that it is capable of being
identified as having been created by one party and
stolen or appropriated by another." Sorbee Intern. Ltd
v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co.. 735 A.2d 712, 714
(Pa.Super.Ct.1999).
3M's complaint reveals that the factual allegations
in paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and 33-34 state a claim
for false advertising and do not fall under the policy's
coverage for the use of an "advertising idea." 3M did
not allege a trademark in its color scheme and its
rating system nor that its color scheme coupled with
its rating system, were wrongfully taken. Purple is not
shown to be a novel color, and Clarcor used its own
rating system-"RPF"-not 3M's "MPR." The gravamen
of 3M's complaint was that Clarcor's color scheme and
rating system reinforces Clarcor's false statements on
its packaging that its Purolator purple filter can remove 97% of all particles while the 3M filter can
remove only 90% of large particles, Clarcor's
Purolator red filter has an overall filtration efficiency
of 95% and testing of both brands by independent
laboratories conclusively proved that Clarcor's
Purolator's filters are not superior to 3M's. (Docket
Entry No. 14, Attachment 3 at ffl| 28, 32-33). In these
circumstances, the Court concludes that 3M's action
did not involve an "advertising idea."
*13 Plaintiff next cites its settlement agreement
with 3M as evidence "that the preponderance of the
dispute between 3M and Clarcor was related to the
Clarcor's alleged 'copying 1 of various 3M ideas in
Clarcor's advertisements, all of which constituted
'personal and advertising injury' " under the policy.
Under Tennessee law, "[t]he pleading test for determination of the duty to defend is based exclusively on
the facts as alleged rather than on the facts as they
actually are." Torpoco. 879 S.W.2d at 835. Based
upon the Court's review, 3M's complaint involved
false advertising. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contentions
on these issues are without merit.

C. Trade Dress or Slogan Infringement
Plaintiff next cites paragraphs 17, 25, 29-31, and
33-34 in 3M's complaint as claims and allegations that
could arguably state a claim for trade dress or slogan
infringement. Defendant responds that 3M's complaint
does not allege claims for "trade dress" or "slogan"
infringement, nor are the terms "trade dress," "slogan"
and "infringement" mentioned.
"To sustain a claim for trade dress infringement, a
plaintiff must prove that the allegedly misappropriated
features of the dress (1) are inherently distinctive or
have acquired distinction by virtue of secondary
meaning in the marketplace; (2) are not functional;
and (3) create a likelihood of confusion as to the
source of defendant's goods." Windmill Corp. v. Kelly
Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874. 94-5890, 95-5137, 1996
WL 33251. at *3 (6th Cir. Jan.26, 1996).
3M's complaint does not allege any of these elements of a trade dress claim nor that 3M had a slogan
that Clarcor mfringed. In Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v.
Fed. Ins. Co.. 252 F.3d 608, 618-19 (2d Cir.2001X
referring to Nike's "Just Do It" and American Express's "Don't Leave Home Without Us" as slogans to
promote house marks, the Second Circuit stated,
"[T]he relevant federal cases indicate that 'trademarked slogans' are phrases used to promote or advertise a house mark or product mark, in contradistinction to the house or product mark itself." (emphasis in original). The cited paragraphs of 3M's complaint involve only Clarcor's "false and misleading
claims that Purolator filters perform equally to, if not
better than, 3M's Filtrete filters." Accordin gly, the
Court concludes that Plaintiffs contention as to trade
dress or slogan infringement is without merit.
D. Failure to Conform Exclusion
Defendant's failure to conform exclusion provision precludes coverage for " 'Personal and advertising injury' arising out of the failure of goods, products
or services to conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in your 'advertisement.' " In Defendant's view, 3M's complaint is excluded under the
policy's failure to conform exclusion because Plaintiffs product allegedly did not conform to its advertisement. Plaintiff contends that the exclusion does not
preclude Defendant's duty to defend because some of
the allegations in 3M's complaint fall outside the
scope of the exclusion and the failure to conform
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exclusion only applies to an actual failure to conform,
not alleged failures. Plaintiff cites 3M's allegations
about Clarcor's use of its color scheme and numerical
rating system that are not "statements] of quality or
performance" and that Clarcor's advertisements left
consumers with the impression that Clarcor's Purolator filters were as good or better than 3M's. In any
event, Plaintiff contends that such "performance
statements" do not trigger the exclusion because exclusion g requires actual failure of Clarcor's filters to
conform to its statements, not alleged failure.
*14 The term "statement" is defined as "an
opinion, comment, or message conveyed indirectly
usually by nonverbal means <monuments are statemerits
in
form
and
space>."
See
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stateme
nt (emphasis in original). Assuming that Plaintiff
established that 3M's complaint alleged a "personal
and advertising injury" offense, as stated previously,
"the pleading test for determination of the duty to
defend is based exclusively on the facts as alleged
rather than on the facts as they actually are." Torpoco. 879 S.W.2d at 835.
In Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v.
Transportation Ins. Co... 500 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.2007),
a series of class actions against Del Monte asserted
claims of fraud and violations of the antitrust laws
arising out of Del Monte's marketing of its pineapples.
Id. at 642. Each complaint alleged that Del Monte
knowingly submitted fraudulent patent applications,
knowingly sent false letters to competitors regarding
its patent rights, and knowingly engaged in fraudulent
patent litigation. Id. at 643. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Del Monte does not point to a single factual allegation that is not a part of a specific allegation of fraud
and that does not use the language of the "paradigm
of intentional conduct." The class plaintiffs can
prevail only if they are able to prove that the underlying statements made by Del Monte were
knowingly false. Therefore, the complaints at issue
in this case fall squarely within the exclusion in the
policy for personal or advertising injury if the injury
arose out of statements made by the insured (or at its
direction) with knowledge of falsity.
Id. at 645. There, the Court held:
The allegations against Del Monte in the underlying

complaints are specific. They depend on a showing
of knowledge of falsity as part of an underlying
fraudulent scheme in order to obtain relief. Del
Monte believes that Transportation still has the duty
to defend them because, as it claimed at oral argument, the statements Del Monte made were true.
But this misses the point. Whether there is a duty to
defend depends on the complaint, not on the insured's belief that the complaint is mistaken. If Del
Monte's statements prove to be true, it will not be
liable in the class actions. It cannot be the case that
the policy exclusion applies only when the insured
concedes that it has engaged in false or fraudulent
acts. The allegations rule, and under these allegations, Transportation had no duty to furnish a defense for Del Monte.
Id. at 646-47.
Similarly, as to the paragraphs of 3M's complaint
(paragraphs 17, 25, 28-31, 33-34, 63 and 65) cited by
Plaintiff as stating a claim, neither d, f, nor g of Defendant's policy covers 3M's false and misleading
claims against Clarcor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that exclusion g in the Defendant's policy applies to bar coverage. Therefore, Plaintiffs contention
is without merit.
E. Duty to Indemnify
*15 Finally, Defendant's policy provides, "We
will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal and
advertising injury" to which this insurance applies."
Because Plaintiff failed to prove damages as a result of
"personal and advertising injury," the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs indemnity claim also fails.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 28) should be granted and Plaintiffs motion
for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 14)
should be denied.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
ENTERED this the

day of December, 2010.

ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum filed herewith, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment
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(Docket Entry No. 28) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment (Docket Entry No.
14) is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
This is the Final Order in this action.
It is so ORDERED.
ENTERED this the

day of December, 2010.

M.D.Tenn.,2010.
Clarcor, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co.
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 5211607 (M.D.Tenn.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ZOBEL, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff, Welch Foods, Inc. ("Welch"), manufactures and sells fruit juice including what it describes as "White Grape and Pomegranate" juice. In
the forefront the label on this product prominently
pictures pomegranates when, in fact, the primary ingredients are white grape and apple juice. It similarly
describes its product in "other forms of marketing and
advertising." See POM Wonderful LLC v. Welch
Foods Inc., CV09-00567 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2009), f
21. A competitor, POM Wonderful, LLC ("POM"),
which produces its own blended pomegranate juices,
sued Welch in 2009 for false and misleading advertising. Shortly thereafter a putative class of disaffected
consumers also brought suit against Welch for false
advertising and deceptive labeling. Welch tendered
these complaints (the "underlying complaints") to
three of its insurers. Two, Zurich American Insurance
Company ("Zurich") and National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA ("National Union"), denied
coverage and declined to defend. The third, Axis
Surplus Insurance Company ("Axis"), denied coverage under two policies, but agreed to defend under a
third while reserving its rights.

United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
WELCH FOODS, INC.
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO., et al.
Civil Action No. 09-12087-RWZ.
Oct. 1,2010.
West KeySummarylnsurance 217 € ^ 2 3 8 6
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage-Liability Insurance
217XV1KB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2383 Errors and Omissions Liabilities
217k2386 k. Particular Exclusions. Most
Cited Cases
Insurer had no duty to defend or advance defense
costs to insured corporation since the policy specifically excluded coverage based on lawsuits arising
from unfair competition or deceptive trade practices.
Insured, who was accused of false advertisement on its
pomegranate juice labels, argued that because the
heading for the exclusion section in the insurance
policy related to antitrust litigation, the exclusion did
not apply to false advertisement. However, later in the
policy, it stated that the headings were for convenience's sake only, and were not intended to define the
policy; moreover, the plain language of the exclusion
was broad enough to include a variety of anti-competitive behavior, not just antitrust claims.
Richard D. Milone, S. Mahmood Ahmad, Shaun M.
Gehan, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Washington, DC,
Edward William Little, Jr., Mccarter & English, LLP,
Boston, MA, for Welch Foods, Inc.
Harvey Weiner, Michael P. Duffy, Alan K. Tannenwald, Peabody & Arnold LLP, Barbara A. O'Donnell,
Brian P. McDonough, Stephen J. Abarbanel, Zelle
McDonough & Cohen, LLP, Joseph S. Sano, Adam R.
Doherty, John E. Matosky, Prince, Lobel Glovsky &
Tye LLP, Boston, MA, for National Union Fire Insurance Co., et al.

Plaintiff brought this suit against all three for declaratory judgment, breach of contract and violation of
Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 176 and 93A. Axis has counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and now all defendants have moved for summary judgment; plaintiff
has cross-moved for partial summary judgment
against each. The policy or policies of each defendant
provide different coverages and contain different
exclusions. I will therefore address each defendant's
motion separately.
I. Analysis
A. Legal Standard
Under Massachusetts law, an insurer has a duty to
defend or reimburse an insured's defense costs when,
comparing the third-party complaint with the policy
provisions, '"the allegations of the complaint are reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state
or adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms."
Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^ ^
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.), 2010-2 Trade
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.))
Mass.App.Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983) (internal citations omitted). In general, "the policyholder
bears the initial burden of proving coverage within the
policy description of covered risks." Markline v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 139, 140, 424 N.E.2d
464(1981). Once the insured meets this initial burden,
the burden shifts to the insurer, who may defeat coverage by establishing applicability of one of the policy's exclusionary provisions. See B & T Masonry
Constr. Co. v. Public Servs. Mut. Ins.. 382 F.3d 36, 39
(1st Cir.2004).
B. The National Union Insurance Policy
Insofar as relevant, the National Union policy
covers Welch's loss "arising from a Claim ... for any
actual of alleged Wrongful Act of [Welch]." — It
defines "[w]rongful act" as "[ ] any breach of duty,
neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement,
omission or act by [or on behalf of the Organization]."
Welch's Statement of Facts, H 35(2) (emphasis added).
FN1. Policy Number 01-223-68-01 encompasses the period September 1, 2008 through
September 1,2009.
*2 Both parties have moved for summary judgment, Welch on the ground it is entitled to coverage
(Docket # 52); National Union on the ground that its
claim is excluded (Docket # 45). National Union does
not dispute that the underlying complaints allege a
"wrongful act" under the policy. Assuming the allegations of the underlying complaint are true, Welch's
statements that its product contained "pomegranate
juice" (if in reality, the juice was primarily comprised
of apple and white grape juice) could be deemed to be
"misleading statements]" and thus fall within the
ambit of the policy. National Union instead disclaims
coverage based on Exclusion 4(c) of the policy, which
provides:
ANTITRUST EXCLUSION
The Insurer shall not be made liable to make any
payment for Loss in connection with a Claim made
against the insured:
alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable
to, or in any way involving either directly or indirectly, antitrust violations, price fixing, price discriminations, unfair competition, deceptive trade
practices and/or monopolies, including actions,

Page 2

P 77,198

proceedings, claims or investigations related thereto

Nat'l Union's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material
Facts, K 4 (emphasis added).
Here, Welch is sued by POM for "unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices" (POM
Complaint 1 9), and by consumers for "unfair competition" (Burcham Complaint H 1) as well as making
false statements which "actually deceive, or have a
tendency to deceive" (POM Complaint ^ 29) or were
"untrue, misleading and likely to deceive." (Burcham
Complaint ^ 63). The question, then, is whether the
underlying complaints allege claims that fall within
the rubric of "unfair competition" or "deceptive trade
practices" in Exclusion 4(c). The Policy defines neither term.
Welch contends that Exclusion 4(c) applies exclusively to antitrust claims for two reasons. First, it
points to the section's header ("[antitrust exclusion")
as evidence that the exclusion is limited to antitrust
claims. Next, it notes that, under the well-established
principle of construction noscitur a sociis ("known
from its associates"), the court must construe the terms
at issue in accordance with the surrounding words;
here, those words relate entirely to antitrust claims.
While the exclusion at issue is entitled "[antitrust
exclusion," its scope is not so limited. Indeed, the very
next exclusion in the contract, Exclusion 19, states that
"[t]he headings in this policy are there purely for the
convenience of the parties and they form no part of the
definition of the scope of the coverage provided."
Moreover, the plain language of the exclusion is broad
enough to include a variety of anti-competitive behavior. Nothing in the text of the exclusion limits it
solely to antitrust claims. To the contrary, the fact that
it includes a range of anti-competitive conduct suggests that its scope is broader than antitrust claims.
Plaintiffs remaining arguments are equally unpersuasive.
*3 Since the exclusion applies, National Union
has no duty to defend, and no duty to advance defense
costs. Accordingly, National Union's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket # 45) is ALLOWED, and
Welch's partial motion for summary judgment
(Docket # 52) seeking declaratory judgment on Count
I is DENIED.
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C. The Zurich American Insurance Policy
The Zurich policy covers Welch's loss resulting
from "personal and advertising injury" arising from a
claim "for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act of
[Welch]." Welch's Statement of Facts, J 34 — The
Policies define "personal and advertising injury" as
follows:
FN2. The policies at issue are policy number
GLO 8445677-06, covering the period September 1, 2006 through September 1, 2007,
policy number GLO 844677-07, and policy
number GLO 8445677-08, covering the period September 1,2008 through September 1,
2009 (the "Policies"). The Policies each have
limits of $1 million per occurrence/$2 million in the aggregate, and a $250,000 deductible.
injury, including consequential bodily injury, arising out of one or more of the following offenses: ...
d. [ojral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's
goods, products or services; f. [tjhe use of another's
advertising idea in your advertisement.
Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts, J 40
(emphasis added).
Both parties have moved for summary judgment.
Welch on the ground that subsections (d) and (f) of the
policy cover the alleged wrongs in the underlying
complaints {see Docket # 55), and Zurich on the
ground that they do not. (Docket # 42).
1. Subsection (d): Written Publication that Disparages
Welch contends that there is coverage under the
policy because both the Burcham and POM plaintiffs
have alleged that Welch disparaged POM's product by
falsely advertising that Welch's product contained
pomegranate juice, and thereby damaged POM's reputation. Welch further posits that the labeling and
marketing of Welch's pomegranate juice were "written
publication[s]" that disparaged its product under the
terms of the policy. The POM complaint contains
objections to specific advertisements of Welch, such
as "[a] prominent display of pomegranates of the
labels and packaging" and a "website where it advertises and markets the misleading [Welch Pomegran-

ate] juice." — See Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of
Material Facts, \\ 9-11,12.
FN3. Welch does not contend that the allegations in the Burcham complaint constitute
disparagement.
While the advertisements at issue here constitute
"written publications," they did not disparage POM or
its products by making false claims about them; rather
Welch is alleged to have misrepresented the content of
its own product. See, e.g., Altapac Trading Company,
Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., No. CV97-0781
(C.D.Cal.1997) (competing olive oil company accused competitor-insured of falsely labeling and advertising its products as "pure olive oil"; court held no
coverage under insurance policy covering injury
arising out of disparagement because the complaint
alleged that the insured misrepresented its own products, not that the insured misrepresented competitor's
goods).
Nor is this a case in which one competitor is suing
another for false claims about the superiority of its
own products. See E.piphany, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 590 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1253-54
(N.D.Cal.2008) (holding that the allegations of the
underlying complaint alleged disparagement by implication where the plaintiff made statements that its
product was the "only" software product in its market
with certain capabilities). The gravamen of the underlying claim here is false advertising, not product
disparagement. Accordingly, the claims in the underlying complaint are not covered by subsection (d).
2. Subsection (f): Use of Another's Advertising
Idea in Your Advertisement
*4 Next, Welch contends that the allegations that
it used POM's advertising idea as its own is covered by
subsection (f).—
FN4. The POM complaint alleges that Welch
has attempted to "cash in on POM's idea of
selling bottled pomegranate juice by marketing and selling to consumers products
labeled as 'pomegranate juice' that in fact
contain little or no actual pomegranate
juice." Welch's Statement of Facts, \ 9. Similarly, the Burcham complaint alleges that
Welch used POM's advertising idea and
misled consumers by "naming, labeling,

> 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\im

^^
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.), 2010-2 Trade
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.))
packaging, marketing and advertising
[Welch's juice] as [containing pomegranate
juice]" and including the prominent display
of Welch's Statement, U 21. See American
Simmental Ass'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282
F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002).
The essence of the argument is that Welch has
"used" POM's advertising idea by claiming that
pomegranate juice is an ingredient (with the attendant
implication that Welch's product has salutary health
effects). However, "the phrase 'advertising idea' relates to the manner in which one advertises its goods"
and does not include the content of such advertisements. Accessories Biz.. Inc. v. Linda & Jay Keane,
Inc.. 533 F.Supp.2d 38 L 387 (S.D.N.Y.2008). The
coverage provision is limited to Welch's use, in its
advertisements, of POM's ideas about how to solicit
business and customers. See Continental Cas. v.
Consol Graphics, Inc.. 656 F.Supp.2d 650, 658-59
(S.D.Tex.2009). Welch has not done that.
Since the underlying complaints do not allege a
covered offense under the Zurich policies, there is no
duty to defend. Thus, Welch's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket # 55) is denied. Zurich's Motion for
Summary Judgment with respect to Welch's declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims (Docket #
42) is allowed.1211
FN 5. Because 1 conclude that there is no
coverage under the Zurich policies, 1 do not
reach the question whether such coverage is
precluded by any of their exclusions.
D. The Axis Insurance Policy
Axis insured Welch against two types of loss. The
relevant policies provide that Axis will provide Media
Wrongful Act Coverage (Coverage A) and Professional Services Wrongful Act (Coverage B).— Both
parties have moved for summary judgment. Welch on
the ground that the policies cover the alleged wrongs
in the underlying complaints {see Docket # 58); Axis
on the ground that they do not, and alternatively, that
the alleged wrongs are expressly excluded from coverage. (Docket # 47.)
FN6. Policy Number EGN711111/01/2006
("2006 Policy"), covered the period September 1, 2006 through September 1, 2007.
The Policy was renewed for two more years.
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See Policy No. EGN711111/01/2007 ("2007
Policy") and EGN711111/01/2008 ("2008
Policy").
1. Media Wrongful Act
Under Coverage A, Axis agreed to pay "all Loss
arising from any Claim for a Media Wrongful Act"
occurring during the policy period. See Welch's
Statement of Facts, \ 38. The agreement defines
"Media Wrongful Act" as:
any actual or alleged act, error or omission when
committed or allegedly committed by an Insured ...
in connection with the creation or dissemination of
the Covered Media, or in connection with the creation or dissemination of Advertising Material relating to the Covered Media, including but not limited to any of the following: [ ] disparagement, or
any other form of defamation or harm to the character or reputation of any ... entity; misappropriation of... information or ideas; error or omission in
[c]ontent....
Welch's Statement of Material Facts, ^ 39 (emphasis added). "Covered Media," in turn, is defined as
the "[c]ontent of the publications, programs, films,
broadcasts, internet sites ... including any electronic or
digital versions...." Id. at \ 40. It broadly includes
internet content. "Content" is defined as "any communicative material" excluding several exceptions
relating to the delivery of such content. Id. at ^j 43.
*5 Welch contends that the allegations of the
POM and Burcham complaints fit the requirements for
coverage under this provision. Those allegations are
that Welch's labeling and marketing its pomegranate
juice was an act, error or omission made in connection
with the creation or dissemination of advertising material relating to Covered Media, and it both (1) disparaged POM, and (2) misappropriated POM's information or ideas.
The argument presents several difficulties. First,
the underlying allegations do not arise from "errors or
omissions in content... in connection with the creation
or dissemination o f covered media or advertising
material. That is, the underlying complaints do not
allege loss arising from the creation or dissemination
of Welch's advertising material, only from the content
thereof. Second, the underlying complaints do not
claim "disparagement, or any other form of defama-
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tion or harm to the character or reputation" of POM.
To the contrary, the complaints allege that Welch
marketed and sold a product that was not what was
advertised. Welch mentions no competitors in its
advertisements. Welch's alleged misrepresentations
concern the contents and quality of its own product
and imply nothing about the content or quality of
POM's product. Nothing about the allegation implies
harm to POM's reputation or character. Third, for the
same reasons discussed above (see discussion regarding Zurich Policy, Section LB.2, infra ), the underlying complaints do not involve "misappropriation
of information or ideas"; nor do they involve the
misappropriation of POM's advertising idea, as Welch
contends. For these reasons, the underlying complaints are not covered by the Policies.

the definition of "promotional and marketing services." The underlying allegations here do not fit
"Professional Services Wrongful Act" for two reasons. First, this provision is usually intended to provide liability protection for insureds whose clients hire
them to provide professional services. See Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Reins. Co., 796 F.Supp. 275,
280-281 (S.D.Ohio 1991) ("[a]n errors and omissions
policy is intended to insure a member of a designated
calling against liability arising out of the mistakes
inherent in the practice of that particular profession or
business") (internal citations omitted). Second, professional services coverage is not intended to cover
claims by competitors. Such claims pertain to how the
insured does business rather than breach of professional duties. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1097, 1102 (3d Cir.1995).

2. Professional Services Wrongful Act
Under Coverage B, Axis has a duty to pay "all
Loss arising from any Claim first made against
[Welch] during the Policy Period ... for a Professional
Services Wrongful Act..." Welch's L .R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts U 47. The Policy defines
"Professional Services Wrongful Act" as:
any actual or alleged negligent act, error or omission
committed or attempted solely in the performance
of or failure to perform Professional Services by
any Insured in his, her or its capacity as such....
Id. at H 48 (emphasis added). "Professional Services," in turn, is defined as "promotional and marketing services," including electronic and internet
advertising. Id.—
FN7. "Professional Services" were initially
defined as services which were "performed
for others for a fee or other consideration or
remuneration; and identified in Item 6 of the
Declaration, including any such services that
are performed electronically using the internet or a network of two or more computers."
Welch's L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material
Facts % 49. Only the latter portion of that
definition (referencing Item 6) was included
in the 2008 policy. Item 6 of the Declaration
defines
"Professional
Services"
as
"[promotional and marketing services."

*6 Accordingly, Welch's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Count II of the Second
Amended Complaint (Docket # 58) is DENIED. Axis'
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 47) is
ALLOWED.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Welch's Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment against defendant
insurance companies Axis, National Union, and Zurich (Docket52, 55, 58) are each DENIED. The defendant insurance companies' respective Motions for
Summary Judgment (Docket42, 45, 47) are each
ALLOWED. Judgment may be entered accordingly.
D.Mass.,2010.
Welch Foods, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3928704 (D.Mass.), 2010-2
Trade Cases P 77,198
END OF DOCUMENT

The question here is whether the false advertising
claims that arise out of plaintiffs complaint fall under
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United States District Court,
D. Minnesota.
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBINSON OUTDOORS, INC., Defendant.
Civil No. 10-151 (JRT/JJG).
Nov. 17,2011.
Eric J. Steinhoff and Brian A. Wood, Lind Jensen
Sullivan & Peterson, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for
plaintiff/counter defendant.
Michael C. Mahoney, Mahoney Anderson LLC,
Wayzata, MN, for defendant/counter claimant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.
*1 After consumers sued Robinson Outdoors, Inc.
("Robinson") in multiple jurisdictions for false representations of the attributes of odor-eliminating
clothing ("underlying actions"), Robinson sought
defense and indemnification from Westfield Insurance
Co ("Westfield"), which was denied. In this action,
Westfield seeks a declaratory judgment that it is not
obligated to defend and indemnify Robinson for the
underlying actions. The Court will grant summary
judgment to Westfield because the claims in the underlying consumer actions against Robinson are not
covered by the Westfield insurance policies or are
specifically excluded.from the policies. Robinson's
summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of
Westfield's affirmative defenses to Robinson's counterclaims and Westfield's motion to exclude testimony
will both be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
I. ROBINSON
Robinson is a Delaware corporation formed in
2002 that sold odor eliminating products, clothing,
and hunting gear. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for
Partial Summ. J. at 1, Docket No. 216.) — Although

Robinson ceased doing business in 2005, it operates
today as Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC. (Id.)
FNL Although the Court cites to several
documents that were filed under seal, the
Court has not used any of the underlying
material encompassed by the protective order
(Docket No. 124). Therefore, this Order is
not filed under seal.
Robinson sold its odor eliminating products under
a license granted by ALS Enterprises, Inc. ("ALS").
(Id at 3.) Under the license, Robinson was contractually obligated to use the advertising, logos, brands and
marks provided by ALS, and ALS created or approved
all Robinson advertising. (Id.)
II. UNDERLYING ACTIONS/COMPLAINTS
In 2009, consumers sued Robinson — (along
with several other parties, including ALS) in multiple
jurisdictions. (Compl. at 3, Docket No. 1; CompL, Ex.
B, Docket No. 1-5 to 1-8 [hereinafter "underlying
complaints"].) The consumers bought Robinson's
hunting clothing based on representations regarding
the clothing's ability to eliminate odor. (Compl. at
3-4). The complaints alleged that Robinson falsely
represented the attributes of odor-eliminating clothing, deceiving consumers into purchasing the clothing.
(PL's Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Docket No. 223.)
FN2. The complaints originally named
Robinson Outdoors, Inc. f/k/a Robinson
Laboratories, Inc. as a defendant. (Compl.,
Ex. B, Underlying Compls., Docket No. 1-5
to 1-8.) Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC
was later added as an additional defendant in
amended complaints. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp.
of its Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 5.)
Robinson summarized the claims of the underlying complaints in this way:
In [the class action complaint by Jonathan] Lange,
the plaintiff contended he had five separate counts
... (1) false advertising in violation of California
Business & Professions Code -5 § 17500; — (2)
violations of the California Consumer Legal Rem-
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edies Act; Civil Code § 1750, et seq.; — (3) violations of the California Business and Professions
Code § 17200; — (4) violations of common law
unjust enrichment; — and (5) civil conspiracy.—
FN3. "Defendants' advertisements for Defendants' odor eliminating clothing contain
untrue or misleading statements concerning
the quality of Defendants' advertised products. The actual odor eliminating capability
of Defendants' odor eliminating clothing is
much less, if any, than Defendants represented.... Defendants knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
that the statements ... were false and misleading." (Compl., Ex. B, Lange Compl. Iffi
118, 121, Docket No. 1-5.)
FN4. "Defendants violated Civil Code §
1770(a)(7) because they falsely and uniformly represented to consumers that the
purported odor eliminating clothing was of
the particular standard described in their
advertising and marketing materials, i.e.,
they uniformly represented that the clothing
eliminated odor and could be 'reactivated'
when neither was true." (Lange Compl. ^
140.)
FN5. "Unlawful, as proscribed by Cal. Bus.
& Prof.Code § 17500, in that Defendants'
advertisements contain unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading statements of material
fact which were and are known by Defendants, or which by the exercise of reasonable
care should be known to be untrue or misleading...." (Lange Compl. % 153 .)
FN6. "Defendants knowingly advertised and
sold to Plaintiff and members of the Class
clothing that was not as Defendants represented.... As a result ... Defendants have realized substantial revenues...." (Lange
Compl. HH 162-63.)
FN7. Alleging that Defendants conspired to
misrepresent the odor-eliminating properties
of their clothing in advertisements and the
"conspiracy was furthered and protected by
each Defendant's knowledge of the misrepresentations being made by other defendants"

and "concerning their odor eliminating
clothing." (Lange Compl.ffl[168-172.)
The complaints in the other Five Actions make the
same factual allegations but tailor their consumer
actions to the particular state where the action is
filed.
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. at 20.) Each
claim in the underlying complaints depends, at least
in part, on the Defendants' misrepresentations of the
odor-eliminating capabilities of their products.
*2 Robinson sought defense and indemnification
from Westfield for the underlying actions under insurance policies it had purchased from Westfield.
(PL's Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2.) Westfield denied
coverage on multiple grounds. (Def.'s Mem. Supp.
Partial Summ. J. at 5.) First, Westfield asserted that
the allegations of the underlying complaints did not
fall within its policies. (Id.) Second, Westfield contended two exclusions in the policies barred coverage—specifically (1) that the advertisements were
published prior to the policy period and (2) that the
injuries alleged in the underlying complaints arose
from the failure of Robinson's products to conform
with statements of quality or performance made in
Robinson's advertisements. (See id.)
Robinson and Robinson Outdoor Products, LLC
eventually settled the claims in the underlying actions
with a sealed settlement agreement that was reduced to
formal written agreements in June 2010. (Aff. of Eric
J. Steinhoff, June 1, 2011, Ex. 7, Stipulated Confidential Final Order for Settlement (Monetary Terms)
at 1-2, Docket No. 224.) After settlement, Westfield
again refused Robinson's request for indemnification.
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J. at 5.)
III. WESTFIELDS INSURANCE POLICIES
At issue in this case is whether the terms of the
insurance policies issued by Westfield cover the attorney and settlement costs of the underlying actions.
Westfield issued two Commercial General Liability
insurance policies to Robinson, effective December
30, 2004 to December 30, 2005 and December 30,
2005 to December 30, 2006 ("Westfield Policies").
(Compl. at 2 & Corrected Ex. A, Insurance Policies.)
The policy effective from December 30, 2004 to December 30, 2005 also contained umbrella coverage.
(id.)
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The General Liability Coverage Form contains
the following provisions:
SECTION I—COVERAGES ...
COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damaged because of
"personal and advertising injury" to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking those
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend
the insured against any suit seeking damages for
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply....
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
b. Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral and written publication of material, if done at
the direction of the insured with knowledge of its
falsity.
c. Material Published Prior to Policy Period
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the beginning of the
policy period....
g. Quality Or Performance Of Goods—Failure
To Conform To Standards
*3 "Personal and advertising injury" arising out
of the failure of goods, products or services to
conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in your "advertisement"....
SECTION V—DEFINITIONS
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast
or published to the general public or specific market

segments about your goods, products or services for
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters....
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury,
including consequential "bodily injury", arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:...
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services;...
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
"advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress
or slogan in your "advertisement".
(Compl., Corrected Ex. A, Insurance Policies,
Docket No. 1-10 at 29, 33-34, 40, 43 (emphasis
added).)
The umbrella coverage policy effective December 30, 2004 to December 30, 2005 contains the following provisions:
SECTION I—COVERAGES ...
1. INSURING AGREEMENT
(1) We will pay "ultimate net loss" in excess of the
"retained limit" that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal
injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
defend the insured against any suit seeking those
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend
the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"personal injury" or "property damage" to which
this insurance does not apply....
(2) This insurance applies only if the "personal
injury" or "property damage" occurs during the
policy period and is caused by "an occurrence" and
prior to the policy period, no insured ... knew
that the "personal injury" or "property damage" had occurred ...
(3) "Personal injury" or "property damage" which
occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to
the policy period, known to have occurred by any
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insured listed under Paragraph 1. of Section
II—Who Is An Insured ...
(4) "Personal injury" or "property damage" will be
deemed to have been known to have occurred at the
earliest time when any insured listed under Paragraph 1. of Section II-Who Is An Insured or any
"employee" authorized by you to give or receive
notice of an "occurrence" or claim"
(1) Reports all, or any part, of the "personal injury"
or "property damage" to us or any other insurer.
(2) Received a written or verbal demand or claim for
damages because of the "personal injury" or
"property damage"; or
(3) Becomes aware by any other means that "personal injury" or "property damage" has occurred or
has begun to occur....
2. EXCLUSIONS ...
f. Personal And Advertising Injury
*4 This insurance does not apply to:

SECTION V—DEFINITIONS ...
16. "Occurrence" means an accident or offense resulting in "personal injury" or "property damage".
b. With respect to subsections b., c, e., f, g., and h.
of the definition of "personal injury", an offense
includes a series of offenses of the same or similar
nature.
c. With respect to subsections e., f, g., and h. of the
definition of "personal injury", an offense includes
a series of offenses in which the same or similar
advertising material is used regardless of the number or kind of media used.
All "personal injury" and "property damage" resulting from an accident or offense shall be considered as resulting from one "occurrence"....
17. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury
... arising out of one or more of the following offenses: ...
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a personfs or organization's goods, products or services;

(2) Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral and written publication of material, if done at
the direction of the insured with knowledge of its
falsity.
(3) Material Published Prior To Policy Period
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the beginning of the
policy period....
(7) Quality Or Performance of Goods—Failure
To Conform To Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
the failure of goods, products or services to
conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in your "advertisement"....

f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
"advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress
or slogan in your "advertisement".
24. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which damages because of "personal injury" or "property
damage" to which this insurance applies are alleged

(Id. at Docket No. 1-12 at 3-4, 6, 14, 16-18 (emphasis added).)
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
In January 2010, Westfield filed this action
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
defend or indemnify Robinson in the underlying actions. (Docket No. 1.) In February 2010, Robinson
brought a counterclaim seeking coverage and mone-
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tary damages for Westfield's breach of contract for
failing to defend and indemnify Robinson in the underlying actions.— (Docket Nos. 7, 19.) Westfield
answered by alleging nine affirmative defenses.
(Docket No. 35.)
FN8. Robinson also brought a bad faith claim
(Docket No. 7) which it later attempted to
revise to a breach of contract claim (Docket
No. 19). This Court dismissed that claim.
(Docket No. 33.)
ANALYSIS
I. WESTFIELD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON DUTY TO DEFEND
Westfield has now moved for summary judgment
against Robinson, seeking a declaration that Westfield
has no duty to defend or indemnify Robinson in the
underlying actions. The Court finds that the Westfield
Policies do not cover the underlying claims. Moreover, even if there were coverage for the underlying
claims, the Court finds the claims are excluded from
coverage by specific exclusions in the Westfield Policies. Accordingly, the Court will grant Westfield's
motion.
A. Standard of Review
*5 Summary judgment is appropriate where there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material
if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute
is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A court considering a motion for summary
judgment must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B. Westfield Policies' Coverage of the Claims
A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction
construes an insurance contract in accordance with
state law. Lanzley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 841,
844 (8th Cir. 1993). The parties agree that Minnesota
law governs this action. Un der Minnesota law, an
insurer's obligation to defend is contractual. Meadowbrook Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411,415
(Minn. 1997). Interpretation of an insurance policy is a

matter of law. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington
Steel & Supply Co.. 718 N.W .2d 888, 894
(Minn.2006). If the language of the insurance contract
is unambiguous, it is given its plain and ordinary
meaning; if the language is ambiguous, it is construed
narrowly against the insurer. Id. Robinson, as the
insured, bears the initial burden of establishing coverage, and Westfield, as the insurer, bears the burden
of demonstrating that a policy exclusion applies. See
id
At issue is whether any of the claims in the underlying actions are covered by the Westfield Policies.
See AMCO Ins. Co. y. Inspired Techs. Inc., 648 F.3d
875, 880(8thCir.2011) (noting that under Minnesota
law, the duty to defend even a single claim "creates a
duty to defend all claims"). In order for coverage to
attach, the underlying complaints must allege one of
the types of "personal or advertising injury" covered
by the Westfield Policies. Robinson argues that the
underlying complaints sufficiently allege two types of
covered "personal or advertising injury" because they
allege that Robinson published advertising material
that libeled, slandered or disparaged the goods and
products of other manufacturers and that Robinson
used the advertising ideas of another.
1. Libel, Slander or Disparagement
Robinson asserts that coverage should attach because the underlying complaints allege sufficient facts
to establish a claim for defamation (either libel or
slander) or disparagement. The Westfield Policies
provide coverage for "Personal or advertising injury...
arising out of one or more of the following offenses:...
Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material
that slanders or libels a person or organiza tion or
disparages a person's or organization's goods, products
or services.'" (Insurance Policies, Docket No. 1-10 at
43.) The Court finds that the Westfield Policies do not
provide coverage because the underlying complaints
did not bring a claim for libel, slander, or disparagement; and the complaints were brought by consumers,
not Robinson's competitors.
*6 Critically, Robinson fails to identify any claim
in the underlying complaints that explicitly alleges
slander, libel or disparagement. Because "the underlying factual circumstances recited by a plaintiff ...
should not be converted into possible, but not asserted,
causes of action," a factual assertion in a complaint
without a claim is not sufficient to give rise to cov-
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erage. Id. at 1134; see also Ross v. Briggs and Morgan, 540 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 1995) (holding that
taking allegations pled to allege one claim and
equating them with an unpled claim is "to engage in a
far too generous reading of the complaint"). Although
Robinson points to an allegation in the Lange complaint that the defendants "disparage[d] those that
disagreed with their claims" (Lange Compl. at ^ 90.),
no claim in any of the underlying complaints pled
slander, libel or disparagement. Cf. Miller v. ACE
USA. 261 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1133 (D.Minn.2003)
(noting that a court must focus on the claims that are
pled, not the conduct being asserted to prove the
claims).
Furthermore, Robinson fails to identify any assertion in the underlying complaints that a defamatory
statement harmed the plaintiffs' reputations. "To
establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove
three elements: (1) the defamatory statement is
'communicated to someone other than the plaintiff,'
(2) the statement is false, and (3) the statement
c
tend[s] to harm the plaintiffs reputation and to lower
[the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community.' "
Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910,
919-20 (Minn.2009) (quoting Steumpges v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.l980)V
Because the plaintiffs in the underlying actions did not
plead damage to their reputations, they would be unable to plead a defamation claim. Consequently,
Robinson has not met its burden of showing that the
underlying complaints should elicit coverage because
they allege defamation.
Robinson also contends the underlying complaints allege that sales of the defendants'
odor-eliminating products were enhanced by defendants' disparagement of other manufacturers of
odor-dampening hunting clothing. However, in order
to be actionable, defamatory words must refer to the
plaintiff. See MSK EyEs Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
NaflAss'n 546 F.3d 533, 542 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting
Brill v. Minn. Mines, 21A N.W.2d 631, 633
(Minn. 1937)). Because the underlying actions were
brought by consumers, not other manufacturers, the
underlying complaints cannot be interpreted to state a
claim for disparagement against the manufacturers.
The Court concludes that Robinson has failed to
demonstrate that the Westfield Policies should apply
because the injury to Robinson arose from slander,
libel, or disparagement.

2. Use of "Another's Advertising Idea"
Robinson also asserts that the Westfield Policies
apply because the underlying complaints concern the
veracity of its advertising. Because Robinson's advertising was provided by ALS, Robinson asserts its
injury arose from the "use of another's advertising
idea." The Westfield Policies define covered "personal or advertising injury" as "injury ... arising out of
one or more of the following offenses: ... The use of
another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'."
(Insurance Policies, Docket No. 1-10 at 43 (emphasis
added).) The Court finds that Robinson has not used
another's advertising idea within the meaning of the
Westfield Policies.
*7 Other courts have interpreted the offense of
using of "another's advertising idea" to mean the
"wrongful taking of the manner by which another
advertises its goods or services." Champion Labs.,
Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 09-C-7251,
2010 WL 2649848, at *5 fN.D. 111. June 30, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Greenwich Ins. Co. v. RPS Prods., Inc., 882 N.E.2d 1202,
1211 (Ill.App.Ct.2008) (finding that use of an advertising idea requires misappropriation of the advertising ideas or style of doing business).— Robinson's
use of ALS's advertising ideas was not wrongful and
did not constitute an offense because it was done under a license granted by ALS.
FN9. Westfield presents no case law to
support its assertion that this language would
cover the licensed use of another's advertising idea. Moreover, the underlying complaints did not allege that Robinson took the
advertising ideas of any of the plaintiffs in
the
underlying
actions. See,
e.g.,
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 772 F.Supp. 2d 994, 1003 ( S.D.Ind.
2011) ("We are hard-pressed to understand how use of a co-defendant's idea, as
opposed to one of the plaintiff[']s, could be
considered an 'offense.' ").
Robinson further alleges that the Westfield Policies' language was ambiguous and should be construed narrowly and strictly against Westfield. To the
extent that Robinson identified an ambiguity, it asserts
that particular terms within the Westfield Policies are
undefined.^^ The Court finds, upon reviewing the
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Westfield Policies' language as a whole, that the
clause's language, when read in context, is unambiguous and refers to the misappropriation of another's
advertising idea. See Smitke v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
118 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. 1962) ("[T]he pertinent
provisions must be read and studied independently
and in context with all relevant provisions and the
language of the policy as a whole.") The Court concludes that Robinson has failed to demonstrate that the
Westfield Policies should apply because injury to
Robinson arose out the "use of another's advertising
idea."
FN10. Specifically, Robinson asserts the
clause is ambiguous because "advertising"
"advertising idea" "first publication" "oral"
"material" and "written" are not defined in
the Westfield Policies.
C. The Underlying Claims are Specifically Excluded from Coverage
Even if Robinson had met its burden of establishing coverage under the Westfield Policies, the
claims in the underlying complaints are specifically
excluded from coverage by the policy exclusion for
"Quality Or Performance of Goods-Failure To Conform To Statements." — The "Failure to Conform"
clause states, "This insurance does not apply to ...
'personal and advertising injury' arising out of the
failure of goods, products, and services to conform
with any statement of quality or performance made in
your 'advertisement.' " (Insurance Policies, Docket
No. 1-10 at 33-34 & Docket No. 1-12 at 6.) The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that if "the policy
contains an exclusion clause," the burden is on the
insurer "to prove the applicability of the exclusion...."
SCSC Corp. v. AlliedMut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305,
313 (Minn. 1995). "Exclusions are narrowly interpreted against the insurer." Id.
FN11. Westfield also asserts that coverage is
barred under the Westfield Policies under the
policy exclusion for "Material Published
Prior to the Policy Period." Although Westfield provided examples of advertisements
like those complained of in the underlying
complaints that were published before the
coverage date (Steinhoff Aff., Ex. 3 & Ex. 4),
it is not clear that every type of advertisement
complained of was published prior to the
policy period. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Robinson, this exclusion is
not broad enough to exclude all claims in the
underlying complaints.
All of the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the
underlying complaints relate to Robinson's products'
failure to conform to statements concerning the performance of the products. In Minnesota, a court is
instructed to focus on the "claims set forth, not the
'conduct being asserted to prove the claim [s].'"
Miller, 261 F.Supp.2d at 1133 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Meadowbrook, 559 N.W.2d at 420). Robinson asserts that there are statements in the underlying
complaints that do not allege the products failed to
perform as advertised. However, because the claims
asserted by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints
all relate to failure to conform with quality or performance, other factual assertions in the underlying
complaints do not matter.
*8 In sum, even if the Court was to find that
Robinson had met its burden of establishing coverage
under the Westfield Policies, Westfield has adequately
demonstrated that the claims in the underlying complaints are excluded from coverage by the failure to
conform exclusion. As a result, the Court will grant
summary judgment to Westfield.
II. ROBINSON'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In response to Robinson's counterclaim seeking
insurance coverage and monetary damages for Westfield's failure to defend and indemnify it, Westfield
filed nine affirmative defenses. In its motion for partial summary judgment, Robinson requests dismissal
of all of Westfield's affirmative defenses. Because
Westfield is entitled to summary judgment, the Court
need not resolve the motion and will deny it as moot.
III. WESTFIELD'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
Westfield has moved to exclude the expert testimony of Aaron Hasler and Scott Shultz. Because
Westfield is entitled to summary judgment, the Court
will deny this motion as moot.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
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[Docket No. 221] is GRANTED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 214] is DENIED as moot.
3. Plaintiff s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
[Docket No. 225] is DENIED as moot.
LET JUDGMENT
CORDINGLY.

BE

ENTERED

AC-

D.Minn.,2011.
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc.
Slip Copy, 2011 WL 5593171 (D.Minn.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabili-

H
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
TRAILER BRIDGE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
an Illinois corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-13913.
Sept. 19,2011.
Background: Freight company sued insurer, alleging
that it breached commercial general liability (CGL)
policy by failing to defend it in underlying antitrust
action. The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, No. 3:09-cv-01135-HES-MCR,
Harvey E. Schlesinger, J., 2010 WL 2927424, granted
summary judgment in insurer's favor. Insured appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals held that CEO's allegedly misleading statement made in interview aimed
at investors and describing general market conditions
did not trigger duty to defend insured in antitrust action under "personal and advertising injury" provision
in CGL policy.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
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217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2298 k. In general Most Cited
Cases
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217 Insurance

ties
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most
Cited Cases
CEO's allegedly misleading statement made in
interview aimed at investors and describing general
market conditions did not trigger duty to defend insured in antitrust action under "personal and advertising injury" provision in commercial general liability
(CGL) policy, as it did not deploy the advertising idea
of "another"; policy defined "advertising injury" as
one arising from "(t)he use of another's advertising
idea in your 'advertisement,' " and use of codefendant's and alleged coconspirator's idea, as opposed to
idea of plaintiff in underlying antitrust action, could
not qualify as "offense" under policy.
121 Insurance 217 €=^1863
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XHKG) Rules of Construction
217kl863 k. Questions of law or fact. Most
Cited Cases
When essential facts of case are not in dispute, it
is appropriate for district court to interpret insurance
contract to determine whether any ambiguities exist as
matter of law.
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170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision
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170Bk373 k. Substance or procedure; determinativeness. Most Cited Cases
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170Bk387 k. Federal constitution and laws.
Most Cited Cases
In diversity actions, federal court must apply
substantive law of state in which it sits, except in
matters governed by Federal Constitution or by act of
Congress. 28U.S.C.A. § 1332.
1 £ Federal Courts 170B €^>391
170B Federal Courts
170BVI State Laws as Rules of Decision
170BVIfB) Decisions of State Courts as Authority
170Bk388 Federal Decision Prior to State
Decision
170Bk391 k. Sources of authority; assumptions permissible. Most Cited Cases
In absence of precedents from Florida's courts
construing commercial general liability policy, federal
court sitting in diversity could consider case law of
other jurisdictions that had examined similar policy
provisions to determine issues of state law as it believed Florida Supreme Court would.
151 Insurance 217 € ^ 1 8 1 0
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XHKG) Rules of Construction
217kl810 k. Construction as a whole. Most
Cited Cases
In insurance coverage cases under Florida law,
courts look at insurance policy as whole and give
every provision its full meaning and operative effect.
161 Insurance 217 €^>1807
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl807 k. Function of, and limitations on,
courts, in general. Most Cited Cases
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217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl822 k. Plain, ordinary or popular
sense of language. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217 €=>1832(1)
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; Disfavoring Insurers
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or
Conflict
217kl832(l) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Insurance 217 €=>1832(2)
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; Disfavoring Insurers
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or
Conflict
217kl832(2) k. Necessity of ambiguity. Most£ited_Cases
Insurance 217 € = 1 8 3 6
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl836 k. Favoring coverage or indemnity; disfavoring forfeiture. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning, and ambiguities are construed against insurer and in favor of coverage; however, the provision must actually be ambiguous, and courts are not permitted to rewrite contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise
reach results contrary to intentions of parties.
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no bearing on whether duty to defend is owed by
insurer.

Insurance 217 €^>2915
[101 Insurance 217 €^>2913
217 Insurance
217XXHI Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2915 k. Matters beyond pleadings.
Most Cited Cases
In Florida, general rule is that insurance company's duty to defend insured is determined solely from
allegations in complaint against insured, not by true
facts of cause of action against insured, insured's version of facts or insured's defenses.
181 Insurance 217 €==>2914
217 Insurance
217XXIH Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases
Insurance 217 €^>2922(1)
217 Insurance
217XXHI Duty to Defend
217k2920 Scope of Duty
217k2922 Several Grounds or Causes of
Action
217k2922(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Under Florida law, insurer must provide defense
in underlying action if complaint states facts that bring
injury within policy's coverage, and if complaint alleges facts partially within and partially outside scope
of coverage, then insurer is obligated to defend entire
suit.
121 Insurance 217 €^>2913
217 Insurance
217XXHI Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2913 k. In general; standard. Most
Cited Cases

217 Insurance
217XXHI Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2913 k. In general; standard. Most
Cited Cases
Under Florida law, any doubt about duty to defend must be resolved in favor of insured.
fill Insurance 217 €^>2914
217 Insurance
217XXIII Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases
Under Florida law, with regard to determining
duty to defend, coverage is determined from examining most recent amended pleading, not original
pleading.
[121 Insurance 217 €==>2298
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2298 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Under Florida law, inclusion in newspaper article
covering multiple topics ranging from what types of
assets company owned and description of its services
to chief executive officer's (CEO's) general outlook on
relevant market of quotations from company's CEO
which happened to be beneficial to company did not
transform article into "advertisement" for company
that would trigger insurer's duty to defend under
"personal and advertising injury" provision in commercial general liability (CGL) policy.
1131 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 3 0 1

Under Florida law, merits of underlying suit have
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217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most
Cited Cases
Under Florida insurance law, "advertising idea"
means any idea or concept related to the promotion of
a product to the public; put another way, "advertising
idea" is concept about manner product is promoted to
the public.
114] Insurance 217 €=>2301
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most
Cited Cases
Under Florida insurance law, even assuming that
brief explanation provided in freight company executive's statement in newspaper article of factors affecting price in entire Puerto Rican cabotage market
amounted to an "advertising idea," antitrust complaint
failed to allege it belonged to another as would trigger
insurer's duty to defend company in antitrust action
under "personal and advertising injury" provision in
commercial general liability (CGL) policy.
1151 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 9 1 4
217 Insurance
217XXIH Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases
Courts need not stretch allegations of complaint
beyond reason to impose duty to defend on insurer.
[161 Insurance 217 €=^2914
217 Insurance
217XX1II Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases
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Insurance 217 €=>2915
217 Insurance
217XXIII Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2915 k. Matters beyond pleadings.
Most Cited Cases
Courts must look to underlying complaint to determine insurer's duty to defend, not true facts of cause
of action against insured or insured's version of facts.
[171 Insurance 217 €^>1832(2)
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIIKG) Rules of Construction
217kl830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; Disfavoring Insurers
217kl832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or
Conflict
217kl832(2) k. Necessity of ambiguity. Most£jted_Cases
Rule that an insurance policy should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured applies only
when there is more than one reasonable interpretation.
[181 Insurance 217 € ^ 2 3 0 1
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2301 k. Misappropriation. Most
Cited Cases
Even if antitrust complaint alleged "advertising
injury" within meaning of commercial general liability (CGL) policy, the injury did not cause antitrust
plaintiffs' damages, obligating CGL insurer to defend
insured freight company in antitrust action, because
antitrust plaintiffs sought relief only for antitrust violations, not for misappropriation of advertising idea.
[191 Insurance 217 €^>2914
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217 Insurance
217XXIII Duty to Defend
217k2912 Determination of Duty
217k2914 k. Pleadings. Most Cited Cases
Theories advanced and labels used in complaint
are subordinate to facts alleged for purpose of determining duty to defend.
[201 Insurance 217 €==>2268
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKA) In General
217k2267 Insurer's Duty to Indemnify in
General
217k2268 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Court's determination that insurer has no duty to
defend requires finding that there is no duty to indemnify.
*1137 David A. Gauntlett, James A. Lowe, Andrew
M. Sussman, Gauntlett & Associates, Irvine, CA, Alan
S. Wachs, Volpe, Bajalia, Wickes, Rogerson &
Wachs, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Barbara I. Michaelides, James F. Baffa, Daniel I
Graham, Jr., Mary F. Licari, Laura A. McArdle,
Richard H. Nicolaides, Jr., Agelo L. Reppas, Bates,
Carey, Nicolaides, LLP, Chicago, IL, Latasha A.
Garrison-Fullwood, Bradley R. Johnson, Taylor, Day,
Currie, Boyd & Johnson, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.
Before HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and
VINSON,^ District Judge.
FN* Honorable C. Roger Vinson, United
States District Judge for the Northern District
of Florida, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Trailer Bridge, Inc., appeals the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant
Illinois National Insurance Co. on Plaintiff Trailer

Bridge's complaint alleging that Illinois National
failed to defend Trailer Bridge in an underlying antitrust action and thereby breached its commercial
general liability insurance policy (the "Policy") issued
to Trailer Bridge for the year July 2004 to July 2005.
Subject to certain conditions, Illinois National
agreed in the Policy to pay any sums that Trailer
Bridge became legally obligated to pay as damages
because of "personal and advertising injury" and to
defend Trailer Bridge against any suit seeking such
damages. The Policy defines "personal and advertising injury" as "injury, including consequential 'bodily
injury,' arising out of... [t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.' " Although failing
to define "advertising idea," the Policy defines "advertisement" as "a notice that is broadcast or published
to the general public or specific market segments
about your goods, products or services for the purpose
of attracting customers or supporters."
*1138 In 2008, various entities sued Trailer
Bridge and other defendants for conspiring to fix
prices of cabotage services between the United States
and Puerto Rico in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. In a section titled "Fraudulent Concealment," the
underlying antitrust complaint alleges that, between
2002 and April 2008, the defendants affirmatively
concealed their unlawful activity. The complaint alleges that the defendants met in secret and issued
materially false public statements about the reasons
for rate and surcharge increases. As an example, the
complaint alleges that Trailer Bridge's CEO noted in
an interview "that customer decisions were driven by
'[pjrice in an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the
freight rate,' implying that Defendants could not rig
bids or set and increase rates, surcharges or fees, and
therefore were not doing so, or otherwise acting anti-competitively." The complaint asserts that this allegedly misleading statement was an attempt to conceal Trailer Bridge's ability to rig bids and effect supra-competitive rates.
In this case before the district court, Trailer
Bridge argued that Defendant Illinois National owed a
duty to defend the antitrust action under the Policy's
coverage for "personal and advertising injury." Trailer
Bridge pointed out that the CEO's interview was published in The Wall Street Transcript, a newsletter
targeted at long-term investors. Trailer Bridge argued
that the interview was an "advertisement" within the
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Trailer Bridge's CEO, and not just the part
thereof referred to in the complaint. Even if
that were error, see Jones v. Fla. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, Inc.. 908 So.2d 435 (Fla.2005). and
even if we too accepted Trailer Bridge's invitation to consider the entire interview, our
decision would be unchanged.

meaning of the Policy and that the CEO's statement
deployed the "advertising idea" of "another" because
the CEO's misleading justifications for price increases
must have originated with Trailer Bridge's competitors
(and alleged co-conspirators).
Granting summary judgment, the district court
concluded^ 1 that Defendant Illinois National had no
duty to defend Trailer Bridge because (1) the CEO's
allegedly misleading statement—made in an interview
aimed at investors and describing general market
conditions—was not an "advertisement" for the
company, (2) even if the statement constituted an
advertisement, the CEO's brief description of market
conditions did not involve the use of an "advertising
idea," (3) even if the CEO's statement was an advertising idea, the antitrust complaint failed to allege that
the advertising idea "belonged to another," and (4)
even if the antitrust complaint alleged an advertising
injury under the Policy, the injury did not cause the
antitrust plaintiffs' damages because the antitrust
plaintiffs sought relief only for antitrust violations, not
for misappropriation of an advertising idea.—
FN1. The district court concluded, and neither party disputes, that Florida law applies to
the construction and application of the Policy.
FN2. The district court declined to address
any exclusion in the Policy because it concluded, for purposes of summary judgment,
that Illinois National had conceded that none
of the exclusions was applicable.
£U In this appeal, Trailer Bridge asserts an array
of arguments on why the district court erred. But the
arguments all stem from the central issue of whether
the CEO's statement triggered the duty to defend under the "personal and advertising injury" provision in
the Policy. After review and oral argument, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for Illinois National for the reasons set forth in the district court's thorough and
well-reasoned order, which we adopt as our own. —
For the *1139 convenience of the reader, we reproduce the district court's order as an appendix to this
opinion.
FN3. We note that the district court considered the entirety of the interview given by

In particular, we agree with the district court's
rejection of Trailer Bridge's convoluted argument that
the CEO's statement deployed the advertising idea of
"another." The Policy defines "advertising injury" as
an injury arising from "[t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.' " We reject Trailer
Bridge's contention that the use of a co-defendant's
(and alleged co-conspirator's) idea—as opposed to the
idea of a plaintiff in the underlying antitrust action—could qualify as an "offense" under the Policy.
See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772
F.Supp.2d 994, 1003 (S.D.Ind.2011) (rejecting a similar argument and noting that research revealed no
case in which "an underlying complaint for antitrust
injury triggered an insurer's duty to defend for an
advertising injury caused by ... 'the use of another's
advertising idea in your advertisement' "). The underlying plaintiffs sought only antitrust damages; they
did not seek to impose any legal obligation upon the
insured to pay them damages "because of ... advertising injury." No facts were alleged in the underlying
complaint on the basis of which the underlying plaintiffs might have recovered damages "because of ...
advertising injury"; and the underlying plaintiffs could
not have recovered such damages because the allegedly misappropriated "advertising idea" was not that
of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was alleged to
have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether.
AFFIRMED.2*1
FN4. Trailer Bridge's request for certification
to the Florida Supreme Court is DENIED.
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
TRAILER BRIDGE, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff,
vs.
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ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Defendant.
Case No.: 3:09-cv-l 135-J-20MCR
ORDER
Before this Court is Plaintiff Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Illinois
National Insurance Company's Duty to Defend (Doc.
11, filed December 15, 2009); Defendant Illinois National Insurance Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff
Trailer Bridge's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 21, filed January 25, 2010); and Plaintiff
Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s Opposition to Defendant Illinois
National Insurance Company's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 25, filed February 4, 2010).
I. Statement of Facts 011
FN1. This Court's use of the word "facts" is
solely for purposes of deciding the Motions
before it. Kelly v. Curtis.lX F.3d 1544, 1546
(1 lth Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff, Trailer Bridge, Inc. ("Trailer Bridge"),
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Jacksonville, Florida. Trailer Bridge offers
integrated freight shipping services between the continental United States and Puerto Rico. At issue in this
case is whether its insurer, Illinois National Insurance
Company ("Illinois National"), has a duty to *1140
defend or indemnify Trailer Bridge in a separate action.
Illinois National issued Commercial General Liability Policy No. TGL 989-58-40 ("the Policy") to
Trailer Bridge for the policy period July 1, 2004, to
July 1,2005. (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1, filed November 19,
2009). Subject to certain conditions, Illinois National
agreed to pay any damages Trailer Bridge became
legally obligated to pay because of "personal and
advertising injury," and defend against any suit seeking those damages. Id. at 12. "Personal and advertising
injury" is defined by the Policy as:
injury ... arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;

b. Malicious prosecution;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry
into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy
of a room, dwelling or premises that a person
occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner,
landlord or lessor;
d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services;
e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of
material that violates a person's right of privacy;
f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
"advertisement"; or
g. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress
or slogan in your "advertisement"[.]
Id at 21.
In 2008, various entities filed class action lawsuits against Trailer Bridge and other parties in different U.S. district courts. The actions shared factual
questions relating to allegations that Trailer Bridge
and others conspired to fix prices of cabotage services
to and from Puerto Rico, in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. On August 13, 2008, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated and transferred those cases, along with all related future actions, to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for pre-trial administration. The
underlying consolidated action is captioned In Re
Puerto Rican Cabotage Antitrust Litigation, MDL
Docket No. 3:08-md-1960 (DRD) ("Antitrust Litigation").
On April 29, 2008, through May 7, 2008, Trailer
Bridge provided Illinois National with copies of the
initial class action complaints and requested that the
company provide a defense to the suits. By letter dated
August 19, 2008, Illinois National notified Trailer
Bridge that the actions did not implicate coverage
under the Policy. However, on May 18, 2009, Trailer
Bridge retendered the individual complaints and the
consolidated second amended complaint. After re-
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viewing the pleadings, Illinois National again found
that no coverage existed under the Policy. Thereafter,
Illinois National also denied a defense to the Antitrust
Litigation upon receipt of the consolidated third and
fourth amended complaints.
On November 19, 2009, Trailer Bridge filed its
Complaint in this Court for breach of contract and
declaratory judgment. (Doc. 1). The two-count Complaint asserts that the complaint filed in the Antitrust
Litigation alleges a personal and advertising injury
offense, and thus, Illinois National 1) owes Trailer
Bridge a duty to defend, and 2) breached the insurance
contract by failing to provide a defense.
II. Discussion
Trailer Bridge moved for summary judgment on
the specific issue of whether Illinois National owes a
duty to defend in *1141 the Antitrust Litigation. Illinois National submitted its memorandum in opposition and its cross motion for summary judgment on the
issues of whether it owes Trailer Bridge a duty to
defend and whether it has an obligation to indemnify.
a. Standard of Review
[2] Summary judgment is proper if, following
discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in
dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Cafrett, All
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986):
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Further, when the essential facts of
the case are not in dispute, it is appropriate for a district court to interpret an insurance contract to determine whether any ambiguities exist as a matter of law.
Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Great AtL Ins. Co., 757
F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.1985).
b. Choice of Law and Contract Construction
[3][4] This case is before this Court on diversity
jurisdiction. In diversity actions, the federal court
must apply the substantive law of the state in which it
sits, "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by act of Congress." Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.
1188 (1938). Because the insurance contract was
issued in Florida and the questions before this Court
are ones of contract construction, it is undisputed that
Florida law governs the meaning of the Policy and its
application to the facts of this case. In the absence of
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precedents from Florida's courts, however, the case
law of other jurisdictions that have examined similar
policy provisions may be considered to determine the
issues of state law as this Court believes the Florida
Supreme Court would. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1231 (llthCir.2004).
[5~11"6] "In insurance coverage cases under Florida
law, courts look at the insurance policy as a whole and
give every provision its 'full meaning and operative
effect.' " State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at
1230 (quoting Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir.2002)).
"[Insurance contracts are construed according to their
plain meaning. Ambiguities are construed against the
insurer and in favor of coverage." Taurus Holdings,
Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 913 So.2d 528,
532 (Fla.2005). "Although ambiguous provisions are
construed in favor of coverage, to allow for such a
construction the provision must actually be ambiguous." Id_ Courts are not permitted to "rewrite contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise
reach results contrary to the intentions of the parties."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
c. Duty to Defend
m m m n o i n n In Florida, "the general rule is
that an insurance company's duty to defend an insured
is determined solely from the allegations in the complaint against the insured, not by the true facts of the
cause of action against the insured, the insured's version of the facts or the insured's defenses." State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at 1230 (citing Amerisure
Ins. Co. v. Gold Coast Marine Distribs., Inc., Ill
So.2d 579, 580-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). The insurer
must provide a defense in the underlying action if the
complaint states facts that bring the injury within the
policy's coverage. W "If the complaint alleges facts
partially within and partially outside the scope of
coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire
suit." *1142Lazzara Oil Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co.,
683 F.Supp. 777, 779 (M.D.Fla.1988). The merits of
the underlying suit have no bearing on whether the
duty is owed. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 393 F.3d
at 1230. "Furthermore, any doubt about the duty to
defend must be resolved in favor of the insured.
Coverage is determined from examining the most
recent amended pleading, not the original pleading."
Id. (citation omitted).
The parties agree that no material facts are in
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dispute. Illinois National's duty to defend depends
entirely on interpretation of the Policy and its application to the allegations of the underlying complaint.
Since these issues are matters of law, this question is
appropriate for summary judgment.
The parties filed a Joint Notice to Court (Doc. 43,
filed June 2, 2010) representing that Trailer Bridge
was dismissed with prejudice from the Antitrust Litigation on April 30, 2010. Thus, the Fourth Amended
Class Action Complaint (Doc. S-l, filed May 12,
2010) ("Antitrust Complaint") is the most recent
pleading in which Trailer Bridge is named as a party.
The Antitrust Complaint alleges violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 3 . — It claims
the underlying defendants restricted competition
through a continuing agreement to allocate customers,
rig bids, and fix rates, surcharges, and other fees.
(Doc. S-l at 59-61). The Antitrust Complaint further
alleges the underlying defendants attempted to conceal their scheme, in part, by making false and misleading public statements about the reasons for rate
and surcharge increases. Id. at 54-57. As an example,
it points to a portion of an interview given by Trailer
Bridge's CEO in 2005. Id at 56. He is quoted as stating "that customer decisions were driven by '[p]rice in
an all-inclusive sense, which starts with the freight
rate[.]'"/</.
FN2. This Court notes that sections of the
Antitrust Complaint, which is currently filed
under seal, are quoted within this Order. See
Order (Doc. 40, signed April 22, 2010). All
material discussed or quoted, however, is
substantially similar to the allegations contained in the complaint filed in the public
record. See Second Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint (Doc. 1-2, Exhibit
4, filed November 19, 2009).
The plaintiffs in the Antitrust Litigation took
these statements to imply the underlying "Defendants
could not rig bids or set and increase rates, surcharges
or fees, and therefore were not doing so[.]" Id. They
allegedly "lulled [the underlying] Plaintiffs and
members of the class into believing that the price
increases were the normal result of competitive market forces rather than the product of [the underlying]
Defendants' anti-competitive efforts." Id.
Trailer Bridge argues that the above allegations

against it "potentially evidence 'use of another's advertising idea in [its] advertisement' so as to fall
within the potential coverage for offense section" of
the Policy. (Doc. 11 at 2). It claims an implication of
market driven pricing constitutes an advertising idea,
id. at 13, and the Antitrust Complaint indicates the
idea was already used by its co-defendants in the underlying action, thus making it an idea of another's. Id.
at lO.1*2
FN3. Trailer Bridge argues that multiple
Policy exclusions, including the exclusion
for injury arising out of criminal acts, do not
apply in this case. Id. at 19-25; see Doc. 1-1,
Exhibit 1, at 13. Illinois National fails to
oppose the arguments, and merely claims
that this Court need not consider their applicability at this time. (Doc. 21 at 31). Thus,
for the purposes of this Motion, Illinois National has conceded the issue.
i. Advertising Injury
Illinois National takes issue with Trailer Bridge's
interpretation of the Policy. According to Illinois
National, the Antitrust *1143 Complaint does not
allege wrongful acts were committed in Trailer
Bridge's "advertisement," or that Trailer Bridge used
"another's advertising idea." Because the Antitrust
Complaint fails to contain allegations comprising an
advertising injury offense, it argues coverage is not
implicated under the Policy.
0
The Policy states Illinois National has a duty to
defend against any cases seeking damages because of
personal and advertising injury. (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1,
at 12). "Personal and advertising injury" is defined as
injury arising out of specific, enumerated offenses,
including "[t]he use of another's advertising idea in
your 'advertisement^]' " Id. at 21. The Policy defines
"advertisement" as "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters." Id. at
19.
[12] The disputed quotation derives from an article published by The Wall Street Transcript ("Periodical"). (Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 5, filed November 19,
2009). The article, based on an interview of Trailer
Bridge's past CEO, covers multiple topics, ranging
from what types of assets the company owns and
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descriptions of its services, to the CEO's general outlook on the relevant market. While it could conceivably lead to additional customers or supporters for
Trailer Bridge, that in no way appears to be the article's purpose. Its purpose, instead, seems to be purely
informational. The Periodical questioned the CEO so
that it could provide a summary of the company and
market to its readership. No representation is made
that Trailer Bridge paid the Periodical to publish the
article or directed its content in any way. Including
quotes from Trailer Bridge's CEO, which happen to be
beneficial to the company, does not transform the
article into an advertisement of the company's. Notwithstanding, even if the Antitrust Complaint identified a relevant advertisement, it still fails to allege
facts showing use of "another's advertising idea."
[13] The Policy does not define "advertising
idea." Yet, the Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law,
has construed the term to mean "any idea or concept
related to the promotion of a product to the public."
Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d
1179. 1188 (11th Cir.2002). Put another way, "[a]n
advertising idea is a concept about the manner a
product is promoted to the public." Gemini Ins. Co. v.
The Andy Boyd Co., Civil Action No. H-05-1861,
2006 WL 1195639. at *2 (S.D.Tex. May 3, 2006)
(citing Hyman, 304 F.3dat 1188).
It is merely asserted that Trailer Bridge made
misleading statements about the reasons for increased
prices, specifically, representing "that customer decisions were driven by '[p]rice in an all-inclusive sense,
which starts with the freight rate.5 " (Doc. S-l at 56).
No effort was made to differentiate or promote any
aspect of Trailer Bridge's products or services. Instead, the statement provided a brief explanation of the
factors affecting price in the entire Puerto Rican cabotage market. Cf. American Simmental Ass'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.2002) ("The
plain and ordinary meaning of 'advertising idea'
generally encompasses an idea for calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase sales or
patronage." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Proxima Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 132,1994
WL 245671 at *1 (9th Cir.1994) (unpublished table
decision) (holding that the shape of a product was not
an advertising idea because there was no allegation in
the complaint "that the design itself [was] a trademark,
or [was] *1144 intended to distinguish the product
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from others that might enter the market." (citation
omitted)). Regardless of whether the statement lulled
customers into believing rates were controlled by the
free market, its purpose does not appear related to
promoting Trailer Bridge's product.
[14] Even assuming, however, the explanation
amounted to an advertising idea, the Antitrust Complaint fails to allege it belonged to another. Under the
Policy, the advertising idea used must be "another's"
to meet the definition of the claimed offense. (Doc.
1-1, Exhibit 1, at 21). According to Trailer Bridge, the
Antitrust Complaint implies the idea was used by its
co-conspirators prior to the date of the CEO's interview. (Doc. 11 at 10; Doc. 25 at 9). It argues this,
paired with the pleading's failure to allege or imply
Trailer Bridge created the idea, "raise[s] the unavoidable inference that the subject 'advertising idea'
originated with an entity other than Trailer Bridge."
(Doc. 25 at 9).
[15] Trailer Bridge asks this Court to infer too
much. "[C]ourts need not stretch the allegations beyond reason to impose a duty on the insurer." Hoilow ay Sportswear, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 58
Fed.Appx. 172, 175 (6th Cir.2003). Contrary to
Trailer Bridge's argument, the broad assertion, "[f]rom
2002 through April 2008, Defendants ... affirmatively
and wrongfully concealed their unlawful conducf'
through "misrepresentations ... concerning the reasons
for increases in rates, surcharges and other fees[,]"
does not imply another individual originated or used
the purported advertising idea prior to Trailer Bridge.
(Doc. S-l at 54-55; see Doc. 25 at 9).
[16] As an alternative argument, Trailer Bridge
contends that airlines routinely cite fuel surcharges as
an explanation for the increase in their prices, which
establishes it was another's idea. (Doc. 11 at 10).
Notwithstanding, courts must look to the underlying
complaint to determine the duty to defend, not the true
facts of the cause of action against the insured or the
insured's version of the facts. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 393 F.3d at 1230. Just as there is no mention
of the purported advertising idea belonging to a
co-conspirator, nowhere in the Antitrust Complaint is
it implied that the idea was ever used by or belonged to
an airline. The Antitrust Complaint simply fails to
allege an advertising idea belonged in any way to
another entity.
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Having determined the Antitrust Complaint does
not contain allegations supporting a qualifying offense, there can be no advertising injury arising
therefrom. This alone is enough to relieve Illinois
National of a duty to defend Trailer Bridge under the
asserted Policy section. Nevertheless, for the sake of
completeness, this Court will address Illinois National's additional arguments.
ii. Causation
Illinois National contends that even if the Court
were to find the Antitrust Complaint contained allegations of an advertising injury, no causal connection
lies between the damages sought by the underlying
plaintiffs and an advertising injury. (Doc. 21 at 8,27).
"It was the inflated costs of [the underlying] defendants' cabotage services, and not the 'cover-up' or
explanation for the surcharge, which gave rise to the
underlying plaintiffs' damages." Id. at 8.
According to Trailer Bridge, though, "[i]t is of no
moment that the asserted Ocean Shipping Antitrust
Litigation claims alleged violations of antitrust law."
(Doc. 11 at 7). All that is required is the Antitrust
Complaint plead some injury arose out of the "use of
another's advertising* 1145 idea" offense. Id. at 16.
This Court must construe the Policy language liberally
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.
Id. at 8. To limit coverage to the situations described
by Illinois National would be to rewrite the contract.
Id
[17] The rule that an insurance policy should be
interpreted liberally in favor of the insured applies
only when there is more than one reasonable interpretation. See State Farm Fire andCas. Co., 393 F.3d
at 1230; Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So.2d at 532. The
Policy specifically states Illinois National must provide a defense only to cases seeking sums that the
insured would become legally obligated to pay as
damages "because o f personal and advertising injury.
(Doc. 1-1, Exhibit 1, at 12).
[18] The Antitrust Complaint asserts the underlying defendants,
restricted] competition by allocating customers,
rigging bids, and fixing the prices of rates, surcharges and other fees for Puerto Rican cabotage....
Defendants' unlawful conduct resulted in artificially
high, supra-competitive prices charged by De-

fendants and their co-conspirators to Plaintiffs....
Plaintiffs and members of the class seek to recover
three times their overcharge damages plus interest,
attorneys' fees and costs of litigation.
(Doc. S-l at 60-61). Thus, it is apparent the underlying plaintiffs allege their injuries were caused by
higher prices arising from price-fixing, not from the
use of another's advertising idea in Trailer Bridge's
advertisement. None of the damages sought by the
underlying plaintiffs in the Antitrust Complaint are
payments requested "because o f an advertising injury, but instead were strictly for antitrust injuries. Cf.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Riso, Inc., 479 F.3d 158,162 (1st
Cir.2007) (finding that the insurer did not have a duty
to defend based, in part, on the fact "the damages to
the... plaintiffs, if any occurred, were due to the higher
costs caused by [the defendant's] higher prices, rather
than any injury to the plaintiffs' reputations"); Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Alticor, Inc., Nos.
05-2479. 06-2538. 2007 WL 2733336, at *6 (6th Cir.
Sept. 19, 2007) ("Because the policies at issue in this
matter do not purport to cover antitrust injuries, and
because the damages sought by the [underlying]
plaintiffs were only for such antitrust injuries, the
policies issued by the plaintiff-insurers do not apply in
this instance, and there was no duty to defend.").
[19] "[T]he theories advanced and labels used in a
complaint are subordinate to the facts alleged for the
purpose of determining the duty to defend." Harris
Corp.
v.
Travelers
Indem.
Co.,
No.
96-166-CIV-ORL-19A, 1998 WL 1657171, at *2
(M.D.Fla. Mar. 19,1998) (citing Lime Tree Vill. Cmty.
ClubAss'n, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d
1402, 1405-06 (11th Cir.1993)). Therefore, the mere
inclusion of the term "marketing" within the Antitrust
Complaint is not enough to bring the claim within the
Policy's coverage. Cf. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 2007 WL 2733336, at *6. It appears the
allegations regarding the purported use of the advertising idea were included simply to exemplify the
efforts undertaken to hide the price-fixing scheme, an
antitrust offense, so that the statute of limitations
could be equitably tolled. (Doc. S-l at 56-57). The
relationship between the purported advertising injury
and the damages claimed in the underlying action is
too remote to say it is seeking damages "because o f
the injury. This Court finds it very unlikely that the
insured or the insurer intended coverage for the type of
conduct alleged in the Antitrust Complaint.
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*1146 d. Duty to Indemnify
[20] The above analysis establishes that the allegations in the Antitrust Complaint are not covered by
the Policy. Thus, Illinois National was not in breach
for failing to provide a defense and holds no duty to
indemnify Trailer Bridge. See, e.g., Philadelphia Indent. Ins. Co. v. Yachtsman's Inn Condo Ass'n, Inc.,
595 F.Supp.2d 1319. 1322 (S.D.Fla.2009) ("[A]
court's determination that the insurer has no duty to
defend requires a finding that there is no duty to indemnify."); Fun Spree Vacations, Inc. v. Orion Ins.
Co., 659 So.2d 419, 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Accordingly,
JUDGED:

it

is

ORDERED

and

AD-

1. Plaintiff Trailer Bridge, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Illinois National Insurance
Company's Duty to Defend (Doc. 11, filed December
15, 2009) is DENIED.
2. Defendant Illinois National Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21, filed
January 25, 2010) is GRANTED.
3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor
of Defendant that it does not owe a duty to defend or
indemnify for the underlying action, and CLOSE the
file.
4. The Show Cause Order (Doc. 36, signed March
31,2010) is DISCHARGED.
DONE AND ENTERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of July, 2010.
/s/ Harvey E. Schlesinger
HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER
United States District Judge
C.A.I l(Fla.),2011.
Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co.
657 F.3d 1135, 2011-2 Trade Cases P 77,665, 23 Fla.
L. Weekly Fed. C 416
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H
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
ROSE ACRE FARMS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COLUMBIA CASUALTY CO. and National Fire
Insurance Co. of Hartford, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-1599.
Argued Sept. 26, 2011.
Decided Nov. 1,2011.
Background: Insured egg producer brought action
against liability insurers, alleging insurers had duty to
defend it in underlying antitrust litigation. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Sarah Evans Barker, J., 772 F.Supp.2d 994,
granted insurers' motions for summary judgment, and
insured appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Posner, Circuit
Judge, held that:
(1) underlying antitrust complaint did not allege injury
arising out of "use of another's advertising idea" in
insureds' advertisement, as required for insurer to have
duty to defend insured under "personal and advertising injury" provision of liability policy, and
(2) insurer's duty to defend was precluded by general
policy provision excluding coverage for "criminal act
committed by or at the direction of any insured."
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

Under Indiana law, underlying antitrust complaint against insured egg producer, alleging conspiracy to fix price of eggs, did not allege injury
arising out of "use of another's advertising idea" in
insureds' advertisement, as required for insurer to have
duty to defend under "personal and advertising injury"
provision of liability policy; underlying complaint was
devoid of any reference to any advertisement by insured, complaint did not mention advertising on insured's websites, which provided rationale for price of
insureds' eggs, and, although complaint alleged that
insured "marketed" its product, advertising in general
was irrelevant without allegation that insured used
advertising idea of another in advertising its product.
Sherman Act, § 1, 15U.S.C.A. § 1.
12] Insurance 217 €^>2278(4)
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIKA) In General
217k2273 Risks and Losses
217k2278 Common Exclusions
217k2278(2) Intentional Acts or Injuries
217k2278(4) k. Criminal acts.
Most Cited Cases
Under Indiana law, liability insurer's duty to defend insured egg producer in underlying antitrust
action, alleging insured conspired to fix price of eggs,
was precluded by general policy provision excluding
coverage for "criminal act committed by or at the
direction of any insured," since participation in conspiracy to violate federal antitrust law was both deliberate and criminal. Sherman Act, §J_y 15U.S.C.A. §

I.
HI Insurance 217 €^>2298
217 Insurance
217XVII Coverage—Liability Insurance
217XVIWB) Coverage for Particular Liabilities
217k2297 Advertising Injury
217k2298 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases

David A. Gauntlett (argued), Attorney, Gauntlett &
Associates, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Christopher R. Carroll (argued), Attorney, Carroll
McNulty & Kull, Basking Ridge, NJ, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before CUDAHY. POSNER, and WOOD, Circuit
Judges.
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POSNER, Circuit Judge.
*1 The plaintiff, Rose Acre, the nation's second-largest producer of eggs, has along with other
egg producers been charged in a number of class action suits with conspiring to fix the price of eggs, in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. (It has been
embroiled in antitrust litigation before, perhaps because it has been so successful. See A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396
(7th Cir. 1989).) Other violations are charged as well in
some of the class action suits, but they are similar to
the Sherman Act violations and need not be discussed
separately. The class actions were consolidated and
transferred for pretrial proceedings to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, where they are pending.
Rose Acre asked its liability insurers to defend it in the
class action suits, arguing that the complaints sought
damages for what Rose Acre's policies call "personal
and advertising injury." As the policies are identical,
differing only in the coverage period, to simplify this
opinion we'll pretend there's only one insurer, one
insurance policy, and, because the antitrust complaints
do not differ from each other in any respect relevant to
the appeal, one antitrust complaint.
The insurer (for remember we're pretending
there's just one) refused to defend Rose Acre, on the
ground that the antitrust complaint alleged nothing
that could be regarded as "personal and advertising
injury." This suit, a diversity suit governed by Indiana
law, followed. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the insurer.
[1] The insurance policy defines "personal and
advertising injury" as "injury ... arising out of one or
more of the following offenses," and a list of torts
follows that includes "the use of another's advertising
idea in your 'advertisement.' " We'll call this coverage
"advertising injury."
Rose Acre tries to connect its advertising to the
antitrust suit in the following convoluted manner. The
company belongs to United Egg Producers, Inc., the
trade association of egg producers. The association
publishes animal husbandry guidelines, see United
Egg Producers, Animal Husbandry Guidelines for
U.S.
Egg
Laying
Flocks
(2010
ed.),
www.uepcertifled.com/media/pdf/UEP-Animal-Wel
fare-Guidelines.pdf (visited Oct. 5, 2011), and permits producers who comply with its guidelines to
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market their eggs as "United Egg Producers Certified." Rose Acre does that, and it also advertises its
compliance with the guidelines on its website,
www.roseacre.com/ (visited Sept. 26, 2011), where it
points out that it sells not only eggs produced by caged
chickens, but also eggs produced by "free-roaming"
chickens—chickens that are not caged (they have
nests in their hen houses but are free to run around)
and subsist on a vegetarian diet. (See the excerpt from
the website at the end of this opinion.)
The website states (along with much
else—including an answer to the question which came
first, the chicken or the egg — ) that "eggs from the
'Free-Roaming' farms cost much more than regular
eggs because the eggs must be gathered by hand from
the individual hen's nest. All of our chickens are kept
in a humane and friendly environment. Plenty of fresh
water, fresh air, and fresh feed are available to each
chicken at all times, with plenty of space for each
chicken to move about and socialize with the other
chickens." www.roseacre.com/eggfaq.html (visited
Oct. 27, 2011). This statement could be thought intended to throw consumers suspicious of the high
price of eggs laid by free-roaming chickens off the
scent, and make them think the high price the result
not of a conspiracy among egg producers but instead
of the chickens' healthful and humane living conditions; those conditions increase labor costs (the eggs
must be gathered by hand) and probably other costs as
well, since the chickens have more space.
*2 But that interpretation is not alleged in any of
the 353 paragraphs of the antitrust complaint. The
complaint doesn't mention Rose Acre's website, or any
other advertising on defendants' websites; it doesn't
quote the passage we quoted from the website about
eggs from "free-roaming" chickens being more costly.
It says that "Rose Acre has participated in and profited
from UEP's and its [presumably the "its" is "Rose
Acre's"] efforts to reduce supply and fix prices," that
"Rose Acre has agreed to the conspiracy by selling
UEP certified eggs," that "UEP Certified companies
[such as Rose Acre] are permitted to display the UEP
Certified logo on their packaging and to market their
eggs as 'United Egg Producers Certified,' " and finally
that "all UEP Certified eggs must also be marketed
with the phrase 'Produced in Compliance with the
United Egg Producers' Animal Husbandry Guidelines.' " But the antitrust complaint complains only
about conspiring to fix the price of eggs from caged
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chickens, and nowhere does Rose Acre's website state
that the cost of those eggs is increased by the measures
taken to make the chickens that lay them healthy and
happy—though remember that it does say that all its
chickens have a healthy and friendly environment, so
perhaps there's a faint implication that all Rose Acre's
eggs are more expensive than they would be if the
company did not give more weight to its chickens'
mobility and social opportunities than to the cost of
their eggs.
But this suit would fail even if one could tease out
of the antitrust complaint a charge that Rose Acre's
advertising was in furtherance of the alleged antitrust
conspiracy. Coverage of liability for an "offense"
defined as "the use of another's advertising idea" in
one's own advertising cannot extend to using another's
advertising idea with that other's consent. Suppose
Rose Acre published on its website the following ad,
written by its director of marketing: "We are socialists, we abhor profits, and we sell all our eggs at cost."
Although the ad might be thought in furtherance of the
antitrust conspiracy, any antitrust liability that it created would not be "advertising injury" because the
company's marketing director is not "another." What
difference could it make if instead the ad had been
written by Rose Acre's advertising agency?
Antitrust liability, moreover, is a major business
risk, especially for one of the largest companies in a
major market. It is hardly likely that parties to an
insurance contract would seek to cover such a serious
risk indirectly through an "advertising injury" provision aimed at misappropriation and other intellectual-property torts.
It is a standard provision, as so many provisions
in insurance policies are; it was drafted by ISO (Insurance Services Office, Inc.), a coalition of insurance
companies that among other things drafts standardized
insurance policies for its members and other insurance
companies,
see
"Company
Background,"
www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Propert
y-Casualty-Insurance/Company-Background.html
(visited Oct. 27, 2011), including liability insurance
policies. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 772, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612
(1993). The provision, which has been approved by
Indiana's insurance commissioner, replaces an earlier
provision that defined advertising injury as "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
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business." 4 David A. Gauntlett, New Appleman on
Insurance Law §§ 30.01(4)(a)(ii)(B)(3HC) (2011);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d
1226, 1231 n. 2 (11th Cir.2004). Rose Acre points out
that "use" does not carry the pejorative connotation of
"misappropriation." True; but the reason for the
change of wording had nothing to do with Rose Acre's
argument. The reason was that a conflict had developed in the courts over whether "misappropriation"
was used in the policy in its common law sense, which
does not include trademark infringement, or should be
read in a broader, layperson's sense. Compare State
Auto Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 343 F.3d 249, 255-57 (4th Cir.2003)
(North Carolina law), with Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v.
Kemper National Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795, 802-03 (6th
Cir.1996) (Michigan law); see also United States Golf
Ass'n v. St. Andrews Systems, Data-Max, Inc., 749
F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (3d Cir.1984); 2 J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair
Competition § 10:72, pp. 10-190 to KM 93. To resolve the conflict, ISO replaced "misappropriation"
with "use" and, for good measure, added explicit
coverage for trademark infringement. Gauntlett, supra, § (4)(a)(ii)(C).
*3 This history makes clear that coverage is limited to liability to the "other" whose advertising idea is
used by the insured without the "other's" permission.
That is what "misappropriation" is; and the question
whether as used in an insurance policy it might embrace trademark infringement does not alter the understanding that using someone else's idea with that
someone's consent is not misappropriation.
[2] Further more, t he policy does not apply to
advertising injury that is "caused by or at the direction
of the insured with the knowledge that the act [triggering liability] would violate the rights of another and
would inflict 'personal and advertising injury' " or that
"arisfes] out of a criminal act committed by or at the
direction of any insured." Participation in a conspiracy
to violate federal antitrust law is both deliberate and
criminal, and is thus excluded from coverage by both
provisions. See Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc.
v. Transportation Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 640, 642-44 (7th
Cir.2007); Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan
Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 43 F.3d 1119,1123
(7th Cir.1994); Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v.
Chicago Ins. Co., 791 F.Supp. 809, 812
(N.D.Cal.1992).
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It is true as noted in the Curtis-Universal opinion
that if an insured asks its liability insurer to defend a
suit that alleges conduct that is potentially covered by
the policy as well as conduct that is not, the insurer
must defend the entire suit. 43 F.3d at 1122; see also
Transamerica Ins. Services v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d
1283, 1285 (lndA99l): Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. OSI
Industries, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 192, 200 (Ind.App.2005);
Aearo Corp. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co.,
676 F.Supp.2d 738, 745 (S.D.Ind.2009) (Indiana law).
But the antitrust suit for which Rose Acre wants a
defense makes no claim that the policy could be
thought to cover.

We note finally that the Eleventh Circuit, in a case
decided a week before the oral argument in this case,
rejected an identical claim by a firm represented by
Rose Acre's counsel in this case. Trailer Bridge, Inc.
v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 657 F. 3d 1135 (
11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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R o s e Acre F a r m s — C a g e Free

li-i-ii

FN* "Answers to 11 Frequently Asked
Questions
about
Chickens,"
www.roseacre.com/eggfaq.html
(visited
Sept. 26, 2011): "11. Which came first, the
chicken or the egg? Answer: According to
the Bible, the chicken came first. 'And the
evening and the morning were the fourth day.
And God said, "Let the waters bring forth
abundantly the moving creature that hath life,

and fowl that may fly above the earth in the
open firmament of heaven." ' Genesis
1:19-20."
C.A.7 (Ind.),2011.
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co.
... p.3d — , 2011 WL 5313818 (C.A.7 (Ind.)), 2011-2
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